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FAIR FOR WHOM?  WHY DEBT-
COLLECTION LAWSUITS IN ST. LOUIS 
VIOLATE THE PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS OF LOW-INCOME 
COMMUNITIES 
AIMEE CONSTANTINEAU* 
Debt collection has burgeoned into a thriving industry over the past decade, 
and it is estimated to be a $13 billion dollar business today.  Yet, most of the 
35% of American adults who owe an average debt of $5000 do not even know 
that a creditor is trying to collect the debt.  In St. Louis, Missouri, over 
100,000 judgments were handed down in debt collection lawsuits from 2008 
to 2012, and the overwhelming majority of those lawsuits were against low-
income debtors.  Collectively, these debtors lost over $50 million in wages 
through garnishments, which often forced households into the unthinkable 
position of allocating what few resources remained.  And, more often than not, 
such financial strain drives families even further into debt because they seek 
out new loans to repay those debts. 
                                                     
 * Note & Comment Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 66; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2017, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., 
International Affairs, 2010, The George Washington University.  I owe my utmost thanks 
and sincere gratitude to my colleagues on the American University Law Review for their 
meticulous review throughout the publication process.  I especially would like to 
thank Sara Fairchild, Lisa Southerland, and Jon Bressler for their tireless work, 
insightful commentary, and gracious advice.  To Professor Mark Niles, a special 
thank you for introducing me to the Mathews test and for providing invaluable 
guidance on this topic.  Last, but never least, I would like to extend my heartfelt 
appreciation to my friends and family—each and every one of you motivate and 
inspire me more than you could possibly know. 
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The debt-collection process in Missouri, from the initial complaint to the 
garnishment of wages, is governed by a blend of federal and state law, both of 
which are antiquated and non-comprehensive.  This combination of laws fails to 
provide low-income residents of St. Louis with constitutionally adequate notice or 
an opportunity to be heard, thereby violating debtors’ procedural due 
process rights.  These violations lead to serious social and economic ramifications 
for the low-income residents of St. Louis. To remedy these constitutional 
shortcomings, lawmakers should provide for specially tailored notice requirements, 
access to legal counsel or advice, and additional financial protections to safeguard 
communities from the overly harsh practices of debt collectors. 
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 “[T]hey aren’t families that didn’t work hard enough or didn’t care. 
They aren’t people who scoffed at paying their debts.” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario.2  You live in Jennings, Missouri,3 a 
city situated just north of St. Louis.  You are working at a job that pays 
you $8.20 an hour4 when you need emergency surgery.  Uninsured, 
your hospital bill is over $10,000.  Because your annual income is 
under $20,000, you qualify for the hospital’s free care program; you 
never apply for the exemption, however, because you have not heard 
of the program, and the hospital does not tell you about it.  Instead, 
you negotiate a payment plan with the hospital’s collection agency, 
making you the debtor, the hospital the creditor, and the hospital’s 
collection agency the debt collector.  After a few months, you default 
on your payments in violation of the terms of the repayment plan, 
and the collection agency files a debt collection lawsuit against you. 
You appear at the court proceedings, but you do not have enough 
savings to hire or consult with a lawyer.  Without the aid of legal 
representation, you do not really know what is supposed to happen.  
The attorney for the debt collection agency takes you into the hallway 
before the hearing and offers you new payment terms if you agree in 
court to owing the debt.  The offer seems reasonable to you, so you 
agree to the terms.  The court enters a judgment in favor of the 
collection agency, thereby making you the judgment-debtor and the 
collection agency the judgment-creditor.  Because you make over 
$870 a month, under federal law the collection agency can garnish 
                                                     
 1. Editorial Board, Editorial:  St. Louis Area’s Black Neighborhoods Hardest Hit by 
Debt Lawsuits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/opinion/editorial-st-louis-area-s-black-neighborhoods-hardest-hit-by/article_a 
f033c9b-b575-5d4d-bb01-7cebb6b573ab.html. 
 2. The premise and facts of this hypothetical situation are derived from 
circumstances described in Paul Kiel & Chris Arnold, From the E.R. to the Courtroom:  
How Nonprofit Hospitals Are Seizing Patients’ Wages, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:00 
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofit-hospitals-are-seizing-patients-wages. 
 3. The city of Jennings, Missouri has a population of approximately 15,000, a 
median income of $27,785, and is 89.8% Black or African-American.  QuickFacts for 
Jennings City, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table 
/PST045215/2937178 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 4. The current minimum wage in Missouri is $7.65 an hour.  Minimum Wage, 
MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, https://labor.mo.gov/DLS/MinimumWage 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016); see also Paul Kiel & Chris Arnold, Old Debts, Fresh Pain:  
Weak Laws Offer Debtors Little Protection, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/old-debts-fresh-pain-weak-laws-offer-debtors-
little-protection. 
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your pay by seizing 25% of it each week.  This reduction in weekly 
income brings your take-home pay below the minimum wage.  A 
month later, you fall ill again, return to the hospital, and find yourself 
in the same exact position in the courtroom shortly thereafter.  This 
situation is alarmingly common for many residents of Missouri. 
The city of Jennings has seen over 4500 debt-collection lawsuits 
initiated against residents of the city in the past five years.5  And 
Jennings is not alone in this struggle.  According to a recent study by 
ProPublica,6 a non-profit news organization, debt-collection suits 
resulting in court judgments in favor of the debt collector 
disproportionately affect low-income communities across the country, 
and the study found that the effects are even more pronounced in 
majority-black communities.7  In the St. Louis area in particular, 
judgment rates peaked in low-income neighborhoods, and in many 
cases majority-black, low-income neighborhoods saw an even higher 
                                                     
 5. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt:  How Collection Suits Squeeze 
Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods.  Latanya Graves, who lives in 
Jennings, talked about the lack of options she faced when she had to decide which 
bill most warranted payment.  Id.  “Hoping that if [I] don’t pay this bill for a few 
months and [the utility] doesn’t get cut off,” she “could see that as a safety net.”  Id.  
“It brings back a lot of memories, a lot of bad memories.”  Id.  Cori Winfield, also of 
Jennings, had to decide between “keeping the gas on, finding a place to live, [or] 
saving for another car” after her minivan was repossessed when she was sued 
successfully by the subprime auto lender that was garnishing her wages to repay the 
debt.  Id.  Stress and anxiety provide one explanation for the hesitancy of Jennings 
community members to discuss openly the debt-collection suit affliction:  “Employees 
often find it humiliating, because the courts have had to intervene and employers 
have become involved in their otherwise private struggles.”  ADP RESEARCH INST., 
GARNISHMENT:  THE UNTOLD STORY 6 (2014) [hereinafter ADP REPORT], 
http://www.adp.com/tools-and-resources/adp-research-institute/insights/~/media 
/RI/pdf/Garnishment-whitepaper.ashx. 
 6. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (reporting on a study that was the first of its kind 
and focused specifically on data from communities in and around three major 
metropolitan areas:  St. Louis, Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; and Newark, New Jersey).  
The methodology of the study conducted on the disparity in debt-collection lawsuits 
focused on the three cities over a five-year period (2008–2012), and it overlaid census 
tract data on population, race, and income with judgment location data that allowed 
the researchers to look at the probable income and race of debtors in the lawsuits.  Id. 
 7. Arguably, low-income residents in majority-black communities in Missouri 
have an Equal Protection claim because of the possible discriminatory effect against 
classes of judgment-debtors due to both poverty and race, based on the volume of 
judgments in collection suits that involve these two classes.  The Equal Protection 
argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Cf. Burns v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959) (holding that a docket and filing fee required to commence 
an appeal could not be applied to indigents under both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses). 
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rate.8  Specifically, the study looked at over 100,000 judgments from 
St. Louis City and County and found that 90% of those judgments fell 
in lower income communities.9  Furthermore, over $50 million in 
garnishments was collected from the judgment-debtors located in 
those communities.10 
When the rates of judgments and garnishments were broken down 
by race while holding income constant, almost half of the judgments 
fell in majority-black, lower income communities, and approximately 
60% of the $50 million in garnishments was collected from judgment-
debtors located in those communities.11  ProPublica therefore 
concluded the following:  (1) that debtors in majority-black 
communities are more than twice as likely as income-equivalent 
debtors living in majority white neighborhoods to have debt collectors 
attempt to recover delinquent debts through legal action; and (2) that 
debtors living in majority black neighborhoods are 20% more likely 
than income-equivalent debtors living in white neighborhoods to have 
their judgments satisfied through garnishments.12  ProPublica noted 
that “[i]t is not unreasonable to attribute these perils to [racial] 
discrimination,”13 but the study also pointed to other contributing 
                                                     
 8. See ANNIE WALDMAN & PAUL KIEL, PROPUBLICA, RACIAL DISPARITY IN DEBT 
COLLECTION LAWSUITS:  A STUDY OF THREE METRO AREAS 1, 6, 26 (2015), 
https://static.propublica.org/projects/race-and-debt/assets/pdf/ProPublica-garnish 
ments-whitepaper.pdf.  Judgment rates in debt-collection lawsuits in St. Louis County 
and City were highest in census tracts with a median income between $20,000 and 
$40,000, and the risk of judgment was twice as high in majority-black neighborhoods 
as in majority white ones.  Id. at 1, 6. 
 9. Id. at 3, 22.  Over 26,000 judgments were against low-income residents, and 
over 63,000 against middle-income residents.  Id. at 22.  The study defined the low-
income range as $22,000–$33,000 and the middle income range as $33,000–$68,000.  
Id.  The median household income in Missouri, however, is only $47,746 (based on 
the Census Bureau’s five year estimates; St. Louis City’s median income is only 
$34,800), 42% of the population of St. Louis County falls below the $50,000 family 
income level, and the data does not relay where on the scale of $33,000–$68,000 the 
bulk of the judgments lay.  See id. at 22; QuickFacts for Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/29,2937178 (last visited Nov. 
30, 2016) (listing the median household incomes for Missouri and St. Louis city); 
American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf 
/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (listing family income 
levels for St. Louis County, Missouri). 
 10. WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 22. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1, 2, 4, 11. 
 13. Paul Kiel, Why Small Debts Matter So Much to Black Lives, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 31, 
2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-small-debts-matter-so-
much-to-black-lives (“But there’s no question that the main reason small financial 
problems can have such a disproportionate effect on black families is that, for largely 
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factors, such as fewer assets in low-income households, fewer resources 
available to lean on, and customer bases with large racial disparities.14  
These results are largely mirrored in the study’s findings in Illinois and 
New Jersey, and reporting shows that many low-income debtors across 
the country, regardless of race, have felt the brutal effects of a debt 
collection lawsuit.15 
The debt collection industry has seen shocking levels of growth in 
recent times.  Indeed, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
estimates that debt collection has burgeoned into a $13 billion dollar 
industry.16  Alongside the debt collection industry is the parallel 
growth of consumer debt, which affects close to 35% of American 
adults today.17  The number of debtors increased substantially during 
the most recent economic downturn,18 and while the average 
consumer’s debt is a little over $5000, most consumers are unaware 
that a creditor is trying to collect funds from them—or in other 
words, that they have a debt in collection.19 
This Comment argues that current federal and state laws governing 
debt collection lawsuits and the garnishment of wages in Missouri 
violate the procedural due process rights—guaranteed by the Fifth 
                                                     
historical reasons rooted in racism, they have far smaller financial reserves to fall 
back on than white families.”). 
 14. See WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 18, 20–21. 
 15. See id. at 1; see also Paul Kiel, For Nebraska’s Poor, Get Sick and Get Sued, 
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2014, 4:00 AM) [hereinafter Kiel, Nebraska’s Poor], 
https://www.propublica.org/article/for-nebraskas-poor-get-sick-and-get-sued 
(recounting the stories of families in Nebraska who have been the victims of debt 
collection lawsuits); Paul Kiel, At Capital One, Easy Credit and Abundant Lawsuits, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM) [hereinafter Kiel, Capital One], 
https://www.propublica.org/article/at-capital-one-easy-credit-and-abundant-lawsuits 
(discussing the volume of debt-collection lawsuits initiated by major banks in New 
York, Nevada, Florida, and Virginia); Paul Kiel, In Alabama, a Public Hospital Serves the 
Poor—with Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM) [hereinafter Kiel, 
Alabama Public Hospital], https://www.propublica.org/article/in-alabama-a-public-
hospital-serves-the-poor-with-lawsuits (reviewing the debt-collection suits initiated by 
public hospitals in Alabama). 
 16. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:  CFPB 
ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 1, 7–8 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB ANNUAL REPORT], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practices-
act.pdf (estimating that the debt-collection industry has roughly 6000 firms with 
140,000 employees). 
 17. Id. at 7 (stating that “77 million of the 220 million Americans with credit 
files” have debts that are in collection). 
 18. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 13. 
 19. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (finding that debts in collection 
can range from $25 to more than $125,000). 
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and Fourteenth Amendments—of low-income communities in the St. 
Louis area.  Specifically, the collection suits brought against residents 
of low-income neighborhoods in St. Louis resulting in judgments 
provide neither adequate notice nor ensure an opportunity for 
debtors to be heard.  Part I explores the social and economic 
ramifications of debt collection for families in low-income 
communities across Missouri and the explosive growth of the debt-
buyer industry, which directly contributes to the growth in debt 
collection lawsuits filed.  Part I also explains the relevant state and 
federal laws that regulate the debt-collection process in Missouri and 
provides a brief overview of procedural due process doctrine and its 
particular application to pre-judgment garnishment statutes.  Part II 
demonstrates that debtors’ wages are a constitutionally protected 
interest and outlines the deficiencies in notice and the opportunity to 
be heard that are commonplace in Missouri debt-collection cases.  It 
then applies a modified Mathews v. Eldridge20 test to the debt 
collection process in Missouri, demonstrating that more judicial 
procedures and safeguards are required in Missouri debt collection 
lawsuits to protect the constitutional due process rights of debtors in 
low-income communities.  Part III concludes with suggestions and 
remedies to satisfy procedural due process requirements. 
I. DEBT COLLECTION IN MISSOURI 
 Consumers accumulate debt through a multitude of everyday 
services, such as credit cards, auto loans, mortgages, medical debt, 
and student loans.21  When consumers fail to pay their debts for these 
everyday services, creditors can file debt collection lawsuits in a 
process similar to that described above.  Various debt collectors 
appear in these collection lawsuits, including banks, hospitals, utility 
companies, high-cost lenders,22 and, increasingly, debt-buyers—
                                                     
 20. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 21. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 
(listing sources of debt as credit card bills, medical bills, loans, and, frequently for 
the citizens of the St. Louis area, “the sewer bill”). 
 22. High-cost lenders, such as payday lenders or auto-title lenders, extend credit 
to consumers under agreements that can contain exorbitantly high fees or interest 
rates.  See Paul Kiel, The Payday Playbook:  How High Cost Lenders Fight to Stay Legal, 
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-high-
cost-lenders-fight-to-stay-legal; Paul Kiel, Let the Game of Whack-A-Mole Begin:  Feds Put 
Forward New Payday Rules, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:07 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/let-the-game-of-whack-a-mole-begin-feds-put-
forward-new-payday-rules. 
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companies that purchase debt accounts at steep discounts and then 
try to collect the debts.23 
When a creditor prevails in a debt-collection suit, that party, the 
judgment-creditor, may collect the amount of the judgment from the 
person who owes the debt, the judgment-debtor.  To do so, judgment-
creditors often seek garnishments.24  A garnishment is a legal order 
that a judgment-creditor can use to collect the outstanding funds from 
the judgment-debtor through a third-party garnishee, such as an 
employer or a bank.25  In debt collection actions, a judgment-creditor 
typically serves the legal garnishment order on the judgment-debtor’s 
employer.26  That garnishment order compels the employer to 
periodically withhold a judicially-determined percentage of the 
employee’s paycheck and send that money to the judgment-creditor 
each pay period until the debt is satisfied.27 
A study by ADP, a major supplier of payroll services in the United 
States, revealed that in 2013, judgment-creditors garnished wages 
from 7.2% of employees.28  The study also demonstrated that the 
percentage of employees who had wages garnished was greater in 
low-income job industries than in higher-income job industries.29  
Notably, the Midwest region of the United States, where Missouri is 
located, saw the highest garnishment rates of the study.30  The 
                                                     
 23. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; see also Kiel, Capital One, supra note 15. 
 24. WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
 25. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 552 (2016) (stating 
that a third-party garnishee holds the property of the debtor, and that the property 
can be reached by a judgment-creditor through a garnishment order); ADP REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 4. 
 26. Id.; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
 27. Paul Kiel, When Lenders Sue, Quick Cash Can Turn into a Lifetime of Debt, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 13, 2013, 10:46 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-
lenders-sue-quick-cash-can-turn-into-a-lifetime-of-debt (relaying the story of one 
judgment-debtor whose entire judgment was satisfied through garnishments over a 
five-year period). 
 28. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.  “There are limited national statistics about 
wage garnishment.”  Id. at 4.  “Garnishments are predominantly regulated by diverse 
and complex state laws.”  Id. 
 29. Id. at 9.  As reported by ADP, the three industries with the highest percentage 
of employees experiencing wage garnishment were (1) transportation and utilities 
(11.2%), (2) manufacturing (10.2%), and (3) construction (9.1%).  Id.  The three 
industries with the lowest percentage of employees experiencing wage garnishment 
were (1) education and health services (5.7%), (2) information services (5.5%), and 
(3) professional and business services (5.4%).  Id.  ADP believes that the imbalance 
in garnishment frequency in these particular industries indicates a “possible 
relationship between garnishment and blue- and white-collar job categories.”  Id. 
 30. Id. at 11. 
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combination of predatory debt collection, garnishment practices, and 
an inability to repay debts has led to a cycle of poverty in Missouri 
that, for many, is unending, unalterable, and unforgiving.31 
A. The Missouri Debt Collection Crisis 
When a family’s single largest expense every month is a 
garnishment, life in the suburbs of St. Louis often forces that family 
to make a difficult trade-off between which bills to pay and which bills 
to neglect.32  Priorities swing unpredictably from securing a stable 
living situation, to keeping the utilities running, to accessing 
transportation.33  One desperate financial situation can easily lead a 
debtor into even more perilous debt, and both racial disparity in 
debt-collection cases and the judicial process in Missouri contribute 
to such a situation.34 
1. Racial disparity in debt-collection lawsuits in St. Louis 
 Debt-collection lawsuits that result in judgments and garnishments 
disproportionately affect lower income communities in the St. Louis 
region, and the repercussions are even more pronounced in majority-
black low-income neighborhoods.35  Between 2008 and 2012, debt 
collectors seized an estimated $34 million from residents in mostly 
black neighborhoods in the St. Louis area.36  Judgments in such suits 
are demonstrably concentrated in areas of St. Louis that are majority 
black, revealing an aspect of racial disparity in the debt-collection 
process in lower income St. Louis communities.37  The debt-
                                                     
 31. See id. (“You go to bed thinking about, ‘How am I going to pay these bills?  
How am I going to do this?’  You wake up thinking about it.  You go to work thinking 
about it.”). 
 32. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (illustrating a couple’s difficult choice to pay 
an electricity bill rather than allocate the funds for their daughter’s dental needs); 
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“When you rank those bills, you’re definitely going to 
put those things that are essential to health and safety—that you can’t function 
without on a day-to-day basis—first.”). 
 33. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (explaining that low-income debtors often view 
a utility company not shutting off power after a missed payment as a “safety net”). 
 34. See id. (providing an example of a resident who took out a high-interest loan 
to save herself from foreclosure). 
 35. See id. (“[T]he rate of judgments was twice as high in mostly black 
neighborhoods as it was in mostly white ones.”). 
 36. Id.  In that same time period, debt collectors filed one lawsuit for every four 
residents in the nearby suburb of Jennings, Missouri, which is 90% black.  Id. 
 37. Id.  (citing April Kuehnhoff, an attorney at the National Consumer Law 
Center, that the ProPublica analysis raised “crucial questions about how racial 
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collection practices of the local water utility, Metropolitan St. Louis 
Sewer District (“MSD”), provide an example of this disproportionate 
effect.  MSD files a particularly high number of debt-collection suits 
in Missouri courts.38  Judgments obtained in favor of the utility 
company affect debtors in black neighborhoods at a rate four times 
higher than in white neighborhoods.39 
Although racial bias in the debt-collection industry is not 
substantially evidenced by data or testimony,40  the “pernicious” gap 
in wealth between white and black communities is.  Wealth inequality 
has  “vastly” expanded along racial lines the past thirty years:  the 
median net worth of black households is $11,000, whereas the 
median net worth of white households is $141,000—more than ten 
times greater.41  Additionally, federal survey data demonstrate that 
black households have lower incomes and fewer assets on average.42  
Therefore, even if a black household falls within the $40,000–$60,000 
                                                     
disparities are entering the debt-collection system and what we can do to eliminate 
these disparities”). 
 38. Id. (“In 2010, [Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (“MSD”)] decided too 
many customers weren’t paying their bills, so it dramatically increased its collection 
efforts.”); see also infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (describing the head-of-
household exemption program MSD has for low-income customers, but noting the 
low application rates). 
 39. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 40. MSD claims to have no demographic data on customers and attributes the 
racial disparities present in judgments on collection suits to the “broader ills [of] our 
community.”  Id.  DBA International, a debt buyers’ trade group, states that debt 
buyers are not aware of the race of debtors when purchasing accounts, and debt 
buyer behavior does not create the “racial gap” in the patterns developed by the 
collection suits—an executive for the group stated, “Truly, nobody is treated 
differently in the process.”  Id. 
 41. Id.; Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, 
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-
recession (restating a study’s conclusion that the wealth gap, despite the recent 
economic recovery, has widened along racial lines, and that the wealth gap is at its 
highest point since 1989, when white families had seventeen times the wealth of 
black families). 
 42. Id. (citing to the Federal Reserve’s 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances and 
applying the data to ProPublica’s analysis).  “[T]he typical white family with annual 
income between $20,000 and $40,000 had about $2,010 in liquid assets, while the 
typical black family in that [income] range had just $650.”  Id.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey found that for individuals earning between 
$20,000 and $30,000 annually, basic expenditures on housing, transportation, food, 
and health care total approximately $22,000 per year.  Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cex (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).  
The average annual income after taxes for the same demographic in the $20,000–
$30,000 income bracket is also reported to be about $26,000.  Id. 
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household income bracket, that household’s median net worth is 
likely to be four times lower than, and available liquid assets almost 
twice as low as, a white household’s.43  Black households also tend to 
have more limited access to social networks or legal resources that 
can provide assistance in a time of financial need.44  Such 
discrepancies demonstrate that a black household often has fewer 
resources than a white household to resolve even small debts.45  A 
“disparity [running] as deep as the nation’s history”46 is not a 
problem that lends itself to an easy fix. 
Racial tensions in St. Louis compound the crippling amounts of 
debt and economic turmoil that the area’s black community faces.47  
In the summer of 2014, the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri 
faced protests and unrest after a white police officer shot and killed 
Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, an act for which a grand 
                                                     
 43. Kochhar & Fry, supra note 41. 
 44. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“Low-income families generally do ‘very, 
very well given the very meager resources and high expenses they have,’ said Michael 
Collins, faculty director of the Center for Financial Security at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison.  ‘But there comes a point in time when there’s just nothing 
there.  There’s no more income, there’s no more savings, and the options are pretty 
limited, because you don’t have the social network, you don’t have the legal and 
other resources available to you to find a solution.’”). 
 45. Id. (“[G]enerations of discrimination have left black families with grossly 
fewer resources to draw on when they come under financial pressure.”). 
 46. Id. (quoting William A. Darity Jr., a professor of economics and public policy 
at Duke University).  The wealth gap between white and black households can be 
traced back to the institution of slavery, but in more recent history it can also be 
linked to damaging policies that promoted white homeownership and restricted 
mortgage access to black households, such as redlining.  Id.; cf. Laura Bliss, After 
Nearly a Century, Redlining Still Divides Baltimore, CITYLAB (Apr. 30, 2015), 
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/04/after-nearly-a-century-redlining-still-
divides-baltimore/391982 (showing a map connecting current poverty rates in 
Baltimore with zones redlined for “undesirable racial concentrations” in the 1930s); 
Brentin Mock, Redlining Is Alive and Well—And Evolving, CITYLAB (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/09/redlining-is-alive-and-welland-evolving/ 
407497 (outlining nine recent cases demonstrating that redlining practices are still 
prevalent and have expanded past the realm of housing and mortgages); San 
Francisco Tells Pizza Shops to Hold the Excuses, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/14/us/san-francisco-tells-pizza-shops-to-hold-the-
excuses.html (reporting on a San Francisco ordinance making it illegal for 
businesses to redline normal service areas for “no deliveries” when Domino’s Pizza 
flagged areas based on prior threatening or violent incidents or reputation). 
 47. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“In Jennings, the struggles with debt 
compound other hardships common to black communities in St. Louis and 
elsewhere:  conflicts and tension with police, and a municipal court system that has 
jailed residents over unpaid traffic tickets.”). 
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jury failed to indict the officer.48  In March of 2015, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a report on Ferguson law 
enforcement, uncovering constitutional violations, corruption, and 
the use of excessive force, and recommending an overhaul of the 
Ferguson criminal justice system.49 
Partly in response to the public outcry after the death of Michael 
Brown, in November of 2014, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 
established the Ferguson Commission (“the Commission”).50  The 
Commission was formed to conduct a “thorough, wide-ranging and 
unflinching study of the social and economic conditions that impede 
progress, equality and safety in the St. Louis region.”51  According to 
the Commission, the lack of economic mobility in St. Louis is one 
underlying cause of the tensions in the area.52  The Commission 
focused on the “two sides” of the economic mobility issue by 
suggesting that improvements in access to education and job training 
in the community have the ability to “push people up the ladder,” 
whereas the negative effects of debt collection “drag them down.”53 
The Commission’s focus on economic mobility underscores the 
more serious problems facing the communities of the St. Louis area.  
                                                     
 48. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-tow 
n-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html. 
 49. See id. (citing the Ferguson report’s statement that the Ferguson criminal 
justice system engaged in “many constitutional violations”); Carol D. Leonnig et al., 
Darren Wilson’s First Job Was on a Troubled Police Force Disbanded by Authorities, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/darren-wilsons-
first-job-was-on-a-troubled-police-force-disbanded-by-authorities/2014/08/23/1ac796 
f0-2a45-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/ 
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (detailing law enforcement practices 
that “violate the law and undermine community trust, especially among African 
Americans”). 
 50. THE FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON:  A PATH TOWARD 
RACIAL EQUITY 12 (2015), http://forwardthroughferguson.org/. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 48 (stating that economic mobility in St. Louis ranks forty-second 
out of the fifty largest metro areas in the country); see also Kiel, infra note 138 (“‘I 
really needed cash, and that was the only thing that I could think of doing at the 
time,’ she said.  The decision has hung over her life ever since.”). 
 53. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; see also FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 52 
(stating that the Ferguson area’s calls to action should “build a love of learning” and 
provide funding for “job training programs that show impact”); id. at 134 (acknowledging 
that in Missouri, “nearly 50% of payday loan borrowers eventually defaulted on a loan, 
even after they had paid over 90% of the loan amount in fees alone”). 
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When a family is forced from home to home, fueled by the desire for 
a stable environment free from burglaries and shootings,54 the 
burden of debt becomes an even greater one to bear.  Bearing a 
sizeable portion of the blame are Missouri’s “lax” debt-collection 
regulations, which have created an environment in which high-cost 
lenders can “thrive.”55  These lenders’ loans are convenient and 
sometimes the only available solution for low-income families that do 
not have access to traditional avenues for credit.56  Not only do 
predatory lenders charge exorbitant interest rates, but they file over 
9000 debt-collection lawsuits each year.57  The Ferguson Commission 
noted that far more black families have predatory loans than white 
families, even though black families constitute a smaller percentage 
of all high-interest loan borrowers.58  The Commission also 
acknowledged the overwhelming and deep-seated obstacles families 
in St. Louis face in attempting to break free from the perilous cycle of 
debt that grips them.  As one resident noted, “Coming from East St. 
Louis from a poor family, I started off in debt.”59 
2. How a loan becomes a garnishment in Missouri:  A transformation with 
few obstacles 
 In Missouri courtrooms, debt-collection lawsuits “fly” through the 
judicial process in droves, sometimes with as many as several hundred 
                                                     
 54. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing one woman who has moved 
her family four times in three years—once due to increased shootings and robberies 
in the area—and another woman whose family moved when her landlord refused to 
fix a plumbing problem that was causing raw sewage to leak into her home); Crime 
Rate in St. Louis, Missouri (MO), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/crime/ 
crime-St.-Louis-Missouri.html (providing statistics on various violent crime rates). 
 55. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 49 (recommending that lawmakers 
further protect low-income borrowers from predatory lenders by capping APR rates 
and reevaluating loan repayment terms and underwriting standards). 
 56. Id. at 50. 
 57. Id. at 49 (citing the University of Missouri’s research finding that on average, 
payday loans in Missouri have an annual percentage rate (APR) of 444.61%, which 
gives Missouri the highest APR rate when compared to the eight contiguous states); 
Kiel, infra note 140 (highlighting the snowball-effect of predatory loans). 
 58. See FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 58 (reporting that 12% of black 
Americans received a payday loan in 2012 as compared to only 4% of white 
Americans); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA:  WHO 
BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2012/07/19/who-
borrows-where-they-borrow-and-why (indicating that although they are “more than 
twice as likely as others to have used a payday loan,” black families “make up less than 
a quarter of all payday borrowers”). 
 59. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
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lawsuits appearing before a judge in just one day.60  Debtors, however, 
are rarely present at these proceedings; some debtors do not even 
know they have a debt in collection until a garnishment appears in 
their paycheck.61  On the few occasions that they do appear in court, 
they almost always appear without counsel.62  Data from 2008 to 2012 
show that in most debt-collection suits resulting in a judgment, the 
debt collector attempts to garnish the debtor’s wages regardless of 
whether the debtor was present at the hearing.63  Many debtors who 
want to hire a lawyer to help with the complicated debt-collection 
process cannot afford one.64  Creditors or debt collectors who appear 
in debt-collection actions in Missouri may be banks or hospitals and, 
more often than not, they are debt-buyers.65  Though federal debt-
collection laws seek to minimize the burden on low-income debtors, 
they often fall short.  For instance, the laws place the “onus” on the 
debtor to navigate the complexities of the judicial system.66  In short, 
a debtor must know the laws exist and how to properly make a claim 
before he can enjoy the protections of these laws.67  Because few 
debtors have access to legal counsel, however, they rarely have the 
information necessary to protect themselves. 
While Missouri law does offer some protections from garnishment 
for the head of a household, these protections alone are ineffective 
absent legal knowledge or counsel.  The notice of garnishment may 
inform a debtor that he can apply for the exemption by requesting a 
hearing,68 but the notice does not always explain to the debtor that 
                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE:  US COURTS, DEBT BUYING 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 36 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re 
port_pdf/us0116_web.pdf (finding that debtors are unaware of judgments against 
them until a garnishment commences, and discussing concerns over “sewer service,” 
where process servers falsify information that a debtor has been served with notice); 
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (discussing a debt-collection suit against Rosalyn 
Turner where the court file reported that she was personally served with a summons, 
but she had no recollection of the event). 
 62. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (relaying that between 2008 and 2012, debtors 
in St. Louis had counsel roughly 8% of the time, and in “lower-income black 
neighborhoods,” only 4% had an attorney). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (sympathizing with a couple who found they 
could not afford an attorney due to medical bills). 
 65. Id.; see also Editorial Board, supra note 1.  See generally infra Section I.B 
(discussing the debt buying industry). 
 66. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
 67. Id. (identifying some legal aid offices that receive weekly applications for 
assistance in debt-collection claims from debtors who “can’t make ends meet”). 
 68. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
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qualifying for the exemption can significantly reduce the amount 
garnished weekly.69  Debt collectors often pursue judgments 
operating under the de facto assumption that the debtor has no 
dependents and is therefore subject to the full 25% rate of 
garnishment permitted under law.70  Therefore, unless a debtor is 
both aware of the head-of-household exemption and actually files for 
that reduced rate, the debt collector can seize more from each 
paycheck than the collector is actually entitled to. 
B. Debt Buying:  The Biggest Industry You Have Never Heard of 
The debt-collection industry has experienced phenomenal growth 
over the past decade due in large part to the advent of debt buyers.71  
A debt buyer is an entity that purchases accounts of defaulted debts 
from original creditors, such as banks or credit card companies, and 
then pursues the collection of the debt, often relentlessly.72  Debt 
buyers typically repackage the defaulted debts into portfolios and 
resell them to other debt-buying companies.73  This bundling 
introduces additional complications into the collection of debt:  as 
the debt moves further from the original creditor, the information 
                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. See infra note 138. 
 71. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The two biggest debt buyers 
are publicly traded companies; combined, they grossed more than $1.9 billion in 
annual revenues in 2014.”); FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS:  THE CHALLENGES OF 
CHANGE, A WORKSHOP REPORT 13 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debt 
collection/dcwr.pdf (“The most significant change in the debt collection business in 
recent years has been the advent and growth of debt buying.”); HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 61, at 10. 
 72. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7–8 (reporting that debt buyers 
account for close to a third of the debt-collection industry’s revenue with earnings 
over $4 billion dollars); see also FTC, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT 
BUYING INDUSTRY 12 (2013) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES], 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-practices-
debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (recounting that in the savings and loan 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the federal agency responsible for liquidating failed 
thrifts auctioned off $500 billion in unpaid loans owned by creditors, and seeing the 
success of the government sales at producing revenue, other creditors began 
engaging in the practice of selling debt). 
 73. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 17; see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty 
Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 53 (2015) (“Subsequent debt buyers of 
an account have no relationship to the original creditor.”). 
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that is being used to enforce the debt collection, such as debtor 
names and addresses, becomes less verifiable.74 
The methods debt buyers use to collect debts range from lawful 
practices to outright fraud and deceit.75  The debt-buying business 
model is a basic one:  purchase a debt (or, more likely, large 
portfolios of bundled debts)76 at the lowest price possible, employ 
economically efficient collection practices, and recoup a sizeable 
profit.77  Debt buyers often purchase voluminous portfolios of debt in 
a single transaction, and the documentation regarding the accounts 
contained in the debt purchase is generally sparse.78  Another 
common practice is for the sellers to disclaim all liability and warranty 
regarding the debts sold.79  Some sellers even include contractual 
provisions that explicitly decline to warrant that the information 
about the debts is accurate.80  Debt buyers, however, are able to 
                                                     
 74. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The sale and resale of debts has 
raised concerns about debt data integrity and information flows from creditor to 
debt buyer to subsequent debt buyers.”). 
 75. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 34–35 (describing FTC 
actions in 2014 against debt collectors that engaged in fraudulent conduct). 
 76. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 29 (“[D]ebt buyers typically 
receive from debt sellers at the time of sale only an electronic spreadsheet containing 
minimal information about debts and debtors.”). 
 77. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 11 (observing that debt buyers 
can “realize substantial profits by collecting even a small percentage of the debts they 
purchase”); Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice:  A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed 
by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 191–93 (2014) [hereinafter Holland, 
Junk Justice] (discussing the “seemingly easy money to be made” from the “purchase, 
sale, and suing upon old, unreliable, inaccurate” records of outstanding debts). 
 78. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at iii (reporting that debt buyers 
obtain “very few documents” related to their purchases, and most buyers receive no 
documentation at the time of the sale); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 193 
(explaining how creditors sell debts “as is,” and that the industry is plagued by 
“inaccurate documentation of . . . consumer . . . accounts”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 61, at 40 (asserting that debt purchases contain minimal amounts of 
identifying information, “such as names, social security numbers, amounts allegedly 
owed, and last known addresses”). 
 79. See Jiménez, supra note 73, at 59–60 (discussing how debts are sold “as is” and 
“with all faults,” and sellers make “no affirmative representations” that they even have 
title to the debts or whether the debts are “unencumbered”); STRUCTURE AND 
PRACTICES, supra note 72, at iii (reporting on the absence of any guarantee regarding 
the accuracy of the information provided about debts during a sale). 
 80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 2; see also STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, 
supra note 72, at iii–iv (explaining that debt buyers have limited access to account 
documents, original creditors often have no obligation to provide any 
documentation to subsequent buyers, and sellers typically disclaim the availability of 
documents pertaining to debts sold). 
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purchase these debts at extremely low prices, significantly reducing 
any financial risk in the investment.81 
Representatives of the debt-buying industry claim to prefer 
resolving debts with consumers outside the courtroom.82  Federal 
consumer protections restrict debt buyers that adhere to this policy of 
“voluntary” resolution from using deceptive or abusive collection 
methods.83  However, debt buyers’ courtroom practices controvert their 
claimed interest in informal resolution because it is well documented 
that debt buyers collect debts primarily through litigation.84 
Once in the litigation phase, debt buyers engage in many 
questionable debt-collection practices.  Debt buyers’ claims can fall 
far short of federal information requirements when portfolio 
purchases provide scant information regarding the ownership and 
history of a debt.85  Yet, debt buyers are prevailing in filing lawsuits 
                                                     
 81. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 23–24 (finding in a study that 
debt buyers were paying an average of 4 cents for each dollar of debt, though some 
purchases were for as little as 2.2 cents per dollar); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 
(“The companies buy debts for pennies on the dollar and then try to recover what 
they can from debtors.”). 
 82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 16 (quoting DBA International, a 
leading industry trade association of U.S. debt buyers, on its preference to resolve 
debts with consumers under “voluntar[y]”conditions).  Encore Capital, one of the 
dominant debt buying firms in the market, asserts that it turns to litigation against 
debtors as a “last resort.”  Id. at 13, 16 (stating that some debt buyers engage in 
alternative collection practices, such as phone calls, mailings, or through third-party 
collection agencies); see also Terry Carter, Debt-Buying Industry and Lax Court Review 
Are Burying Defendants in Defaults, ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 4:20 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/debt_buying_industry_and_lax_court
_review_are_burying_defendants_in_default (“The last thing a debt buyer wants to 
do is file suit and seek judgment . . . .  They want to work out a payment plan.  It’s 
expensive to sue.  We sue the ‘won’t pays,’ not the ‘can’t pays.’” (quoting Jan Stieger, 
Executive Director of DBA International)). 
 83. See infra Section I.C.1 (reviewing the protections of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”)). 
 84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 13 (alleging that hundreds of 
thousands of new debt-collection claims are filed across the country by debt buyers 
each year); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 183 (“Lawsuits filed by junk debt 
buyers expose a business model that is, literally, the buying and selling of claims to 
be utilized in litigation for profit.”); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (charging that 
debt buyers “now routinely use the courts to pursue millions of people over even 
small consumer debts” and “filed the most suits of any type of plaintiffs between 2008 
and 2012”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 16 (reporting that in 
2014, two large-scale debt buyers together earned nearly $1 billion through debt 
collection lawsuits alone, which amounted to roughly half of their total respective 
collections for the year). 
 85. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of 
information that is passed on with a debt during a sale). 
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that should fail for a whole host of reasons, one example being 
affidavits with inaccurate and unverified information about who owns 
a debt or how much the consumer actually owes.86 
Most courts require debt-buyers seeking to collect a debt to submit 
an affidavit “attesting that they have personal knowledge of the debt 
at issue and believe that the allegations presented in the lawsuit are 
true and accurate.”87  The common industry practice of “robo-
signing,” however, aggravates the risk that these debt buyers are 
including incorrect or deficient information in these affidavits.88  
“Robo-signing,” which is “the practice of signing affidavits and other 
documents so quickly” that the information in the document “could 
not possibly” be verified by the signer, has led to much of the faulty 
information provided in lawsuits.89  Including unverified and 
potentially inaccurate information means that such lawsuits may 
actually target the wrong person or the wrong debt, further 
exacerbating problems with the debt-collection process. 
Debt buyers filing claims seeking to recover uncollectable debts 
should also fail at the filing stage.  A debt is uncollectable when, for 
instance, the debt has already been paid in full or is already in 
collection elsewhere.90  Failures to satisfy documentation 
requirements when filing a claim can lead debt buyers to sue a 
consumer twice on a debt that has already been recovered, paid, or 
settled elsewhere, causing “duplicative judgments.”91  Such judgments 
mean that debtors may find themselves paying one debt collector 
only to be sued on the same debt by a separate debt collector.92  Or, a 
debtor may be trying to repay the original creditor without knowing 
that the debt has been sold.93 
                                                     
 86. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 45; infra notes 114–15 and 
accompanying text (reviewing the verification requirements under the FDCPA). 
 87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 45 & n.119 (acknowledging the 
affidavit as necessary to ensure compliance with the “‘business records exemption’ to 
the general bar on hearsay evidence”). 
 88. Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court:  
Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L.  259, 268–69 
(2011) [hereinafter Holland, Robo-Signing]. 
 89. Id.  Employees at debt-collection firms report signing hundreds of affidavits a 
day, with one woman even reporting that she signed an affidavit about every thirteen 
seconds.  David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard:  Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
31, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/01debt.html. 
 90. Holland, Robo-Signing, supra note 88, at 270–71. 
 91. Id. (chastising this confusing practice, noting that it can even lead to firms 
filing suit against each other to obtain the right to collect on a debt). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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Time-barred claims, or “zombie debts,” are also improperly filed if 
they are brought after the statute of limitations has run.94  While 
knowingly filing or threatening to file a time-barred claim for debt is 
an unfair practice in violation of federal law,95 courts have held that 
simply attempting to collect on a “potentially time-barred debt that is 
otherwise valid” is not a violation.96  Furthermore, while federal law 
limits the types of actions debt buyers can take over time-barred debt, 
consumers must assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense in most states.97  Because debtors often lack awareness of the 
legal process and lack representation, this requirement results in a 
much larger window of time in which a debt buyer can legally 
attempt to collect on a debt. 
Concern regarding unethical debt-collection practices has not 
slowed the debt-buyer industry down.98  In 2013, one of the largest 
                                                     
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt 
Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 327–28 (2014) (“Just as the zombies in movies come 
back from the dead to terrorize individuals, dead debts may resurface to wreak havoc 
on consumers.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 96. See id.; see also Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 35 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(permitting debt collectors to seek repayment of time-barred debt, as long as there is 
no threat of legal action); Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., PC, 533 F. Supp. 2d 290, 303 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although it is permissible for a debt collector to seek to collect on a 
time-barred debt voluntarily, it is prohibited from threatening litigation with respect to 
such a debt.”); Kimber v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 
1987) (limiting debt collectors from filing lawsuits that appear to be time-barred when 
filed, rather than suits that were later determined to be time-barred).  But see McMahon 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014) (splitting from the Third 
and Eighth Circuits by holding that threatened litigation is not required for a 
misrepresentation claim under the FDCPA); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, 
Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 511, 513 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a settlement offer letter for a 
time-barred debt did violate the FDCPA, despite no mention of litigation in the letter).  
See generally Sobol, supra note 94, at 328, 330–31, 345, 369 (addressing the growth of 
litigation over “zombie”—or time-barred—debts, the failure of federal law to prevent 
courts from reaching the judgment stage in suits filed to collect time-barred debts, 
and how states can correct the problem). 
 97. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 45; see also APRIL KUEHNHOFF & 
MARGOT SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., ZOMBIE DEBT:  WHAT THE CFPB SHOULD 
DO ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO COLLECT OLD DEBT 2 (2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/report-zombie-debt-2015.pdf (“Debt 
collectors frequently exploit [consumer] ignorance [of time-barred debt] by pursuing 
collection of old debts long after the relevant statute of limitations has run.”). 
 98. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 11 (reporting that in 2013 and 
2014 an industry-leading debt buyer purchased accounts totaling almost $100 
billon); STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at ii (finding that over three years, 
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debt-buying companies in the country reportedly collected over $1 
billion in outstanding debts.99  The movement in the debt buyer 
industry of a debt from creditor to debt buyer to subsequent debt 
buyer thus creates “untraceable cycles” of debt resales that do not 
adequately retain consumers’ personal information or protect it from 
being used erroneously by the debt buyer in collection attempts.100 
C. Federal and State Law Regulating Debt-Collection Practices in Missouri 
In Missouri, a combined regime of state and federal laws regulates 
debt-collection practices, from initiating a claim through the 
collection of a court judgment.  The applicable federal laws are 
specific to debt collection and wage garnishment, while the relevant 
Missouri state laws are general to all civil actions, including the 
enforcement of judgments.101 
1. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”)102 in 1977 in response to the “abusive, deceptive, and 
unfair” practices debt collectors increasingly employed against 
consumers.103  The language of the FDCPA makes clear that Congress 
was trying to protect the rights of ethical creditors to collect on valid 
debts while also limiting the ability of unscrupulous third-party debt 
collectors to manipulate or mistreat consumers.104  The FDCPA 
defines “creditor” as any person who extends credit that creates a 
debt.105  However, the statute explicitly excludes from the definition 
                                                     
debt buyers purchased over 5000 portfolios containing almost 90 million consumer 
accounts with a cumulative value of $143 billion). 
 99. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
 100. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8–9 (contending that with the lax 
hold over personally identifying information attached to the ownership of the debt, 
it becomes far more difficult for debt buyers to ensure that they have “unique 
ownership” over the debts they are trying to collect). 
 101. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1692 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–.1610 (2016). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. 
 103. Id.  The FDCPA defines “consumer” as a “natural person obligated or 
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.”  Id. § 1692a(3). 
 104. Id. § 1692(b) (“Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are 
inadequate to protect consumers.”); id. §§ 1692b, 1692d (addressing and limiting the 
ability of debt collectors to contact consumers); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 802, 91 Stat. 874, 874 (1977) (declaring that “[a]busive debt 
practices contribute” to the development of social ills such as “bankruptcies, . . . 
marital instability, [and] the loss of jobs,” and ensuring the protection of “debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices”). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 
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of creditor a person who receives “an assignment or transfer of a debt 
in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt 
for another.”106  A “debt collector” is defined in the FDCPA as any 
person whose “principal purpose . . . is the collection of any debts, or 
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”107  Based 
on the plain language of these definitions and the case law 
interpreting their scope, courts interpret the term “debt collector” as 
encompassing debt-collection agencies, debt-buying entities, and 
debt-collection law firms.108 
The FDCPA protects consumers from a variety of unfair and 
unconscionable collection practices,109 including harassment or 
abuse, the use or threat of violence, the use of obscene language, or 
public reputational harm.110  A debt collector is also prohibited from 
engaging in false or misleading representations related to the 
collection of a consumer’s debt.111  Specifically, debt collectors 
                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. § 1692a(6). 
 108. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, What Constitutes “Debt Collector” for 
Purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6)), 173 A.L.R. Fed. 223 
§ 2a (2001).  Debt buyers and debt-collection law firms who purchase debt have tried 
to argue that they do not fall under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector.”  Id.  
Courts have routinely ruled against this line of reasoning.  Id.; see, e.g., McKinney v. 
Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a purchaser of 
a defaulted debt still falls under the definition of debt collector in the FDCPA); FTC 
v. Check Inv’rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a company 
was a debt collector because an entity cannot be both a “creditor” and “debt 
collector” under the FDCPA, and the debts were obtained after they were already in 
default); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that 
Congress removed the statutory exception for attorneys collecting debt on behalf of 
clients, and finding that an attorney engaging in that practice was a debt collector 
under the FDCPA); see also Conor P. Duffy, Note, A Sum Uncertain:  Preserving Due 
Process and Preventing Default Judgments in Consumer Debt Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147, 1168 nn.139–40 (2013) (reviewing cases that interpreted 
“debt collector” broadly). 
 109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (forbidding debt collectors from issuing arbitrary fees or 
charges; cashing or threatening to cash checks in a delayed or premature fashion, 
demanding payment by threat of criminal prosecution or baseless threats of judicial 
action, communicating about the debt via postcard, or attempting to disguise a 
mailed notice as something else). 
 110. See id. § 1692d. 
 111. Id. § 1692e. 
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cannot misrepresent the legal status of a debt, the threat of legal 
action, or the information regarding applicable legal remedies.112 
The FDCPA requires debt collectors to follow certain procedural 
obligations as well.  In a debt collector’s initial communication with 
the consumer, whether written or oral, the debt collector must 
disclose that it is attempting to collect a debt, and that any 
information gained from the interaction with the consumer may be 
used in further attempts to secure repayment.113  The burden of 
validating the information connected to a debt in collection also falls 
on the debt collector.114  A debt collector must send a validation 
notice to the consumer within five days of the initial contact and 
provide baseline information regarding the debt.115 
There are few affirmative actions available to consumers to combat 
abuses by debt collectors.  A consumer can dispute a debt within 
thirty days of receiving the validation notice.116  Upon notice of the 
dispute, the debt collector must cease all efforts to collect the debt 
until further information verifying the amount and owner of the debt 
has been provided to the debtor.117  Furthermore, a consumer can 
halt all communication with a debt collector if the consumer notifies 
the collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay the debt or 
                                                     
 112. Id. (stating that debt collectors cannot falsely lead a debtor to believe that 
they may be subject to a garnishment, the loss of a defense, a seizure, or any other 
legal ramifications). 
 113. Id. § 1692e(11). 
 114. Id. § 1692g(a).  The validation notice must include the following information: 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of 
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt 
will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, 
the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 
against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be 
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-
day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and 
address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
Id. 
 115. Id.  If the debt collector meets the notice requirement during the initial 
communication, the debt collector does not need to send a separate validation 
notice.  Id. 
 116. Id. § 1692g(b). 
 117. Id. 
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that the consumer wants the collector to cease all communication.118  
Of note, the FDCPA precludes debt collectors from using a 
consumer’s failure to dispute the validity of a debt as an admission of 
liability in a lawsuit.119  The final safeguard in the FDCPA creates an 
individual private right of action, imposing potential civil liability on 
any debt collector who fails to act in accordance with any of the 
requirements of the FDCPA.120 
2. The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
(“CCPA”).121  The legislature was aware that predatory lenders would 
continue employing harmful practices against consumers absent 
protections against the unrestricted garnishment of wages.122  
Congress enacted the CCPA to protect the poorest populations—
those making minimum wage or less—from garnishment.123  
Nonetheless, as ADP stated in its garnishment study, “the laws have 
not necessarily evolved with the times.”124  Applying the CCPA today is 
increasingly complicated because the minimum wage calculation has 
not been scaled to account for inflation over the past several 
decades.125  In 1968, the federal minimum wage was $1.60; adjusted 
for inflation, that equals $10.34 in 2012 dollars.126  The current 
federal minimum wage is only $7.25, meaning the law will only 
protect workers who earn less than $217.50 per week.127  Under the 
                                                     
 118. Id. § 1692c(c) (indicating that debt collectors can continue communication 
to invoke a specific remedy). 
 119. Id. § 1692g(c). 
 120. See id. § 1692k (detailing that a debt collector found liable to the debtor 
could be held responsible for actual damages, additional damages as allowed by the 
court up to $1000, and attorney’s fees); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 
1171 n.1 (2013) (recognizing that the private enforcement provision of the FDCPA 
authorizes aggrieved debtors to recover from debt collectors who “fail[] to comply” 
with the FDCPA). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1671. 
 122. See id. § 1671(a)(1), (2) (“The unrestricted garnishment of compensation . . . 
encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit.  Such extensions of credit 
divert money into excessive credit payments . . . .  The application of garnishment as 
a creditors’ remedy frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor . . . .”). 
 123. Id. § 1673(a). 
 124. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 125. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (stating that the current method of 
calculation for garnishment is the same standard used in 1968, “when the financial 
life of Americans was much simpler”). 
 126. Minimum Wage Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/mi 
nimum-wage/chart1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 127. Id.; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
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CCPA, only workers earning approximately $11,000 or less per year 
qualify for the statute’s garnishment protections.128  An income at 
that rate places a worker at or below the federal poverty guidelines.129 
The CCPA also caps the amount that a worker’s after-tax pay can 
be garnished at 25%, which federal survey data indicates is enough of 
a deduction in income to place a strain on family finances.130  Local 
reporting by ProPublica and NPR shows that debtors are losing 
hundreds of dollars each week in garnished wages to debt collectors 
that have obtained judgments on outstanding debts.131 
The CCPA is silent on a debt collector’s authority to seize funds 
from a debtor’s bank account.132  This omission creates a gap in the 
federal law regulating the garnishment of funds after a court has 
awarded a judgment in a debt-collection lawsuit.  Essentially, once a 
judgment-debtor who is legally subject to a wage garnishment 
deposits a paycheck into a bank account, the statute’s silence allows a 
judgment-creditor to seize all of the funds in that bank account—far 
more than the 25% the CCPA contemplates.133 
The CCPA includes safeguards for heads of households and 
consumers who are already subject to a pre-existing court-ordered 
                                                     
 128. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
 129. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3236–
37 (Jan. 22, 2015) (stating that for a single-person household, the poverty guideline 
is $11,670).  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2015, 43.1 million Americans 
lived below the HHS poverty guidelines.  BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:  2015, at 12 (2016). 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2012) (stating that the maximum garnishment rate is 
either 25% of disposable weekly earnings or the amount calculated using the federal 
minimum wage, whichever is less); Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (“It makes you feel 
hopeless, that you’re working for no reason and that you’re never going to be able to 
succeed.”).  The Federal Reserve, in a recent survey, found that nearly 20% of 
respondents with average salaries of $20,000–$30,000 felt that they could not possibly 
cover an emergency expense of $400.  Id. 
 131. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (reporting on a Nebraska household that loses 
about $760 each month and how, in repeated instances, the family saw hundreds of 
dollars garnished from their bank account at once); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 
(discussing Yolonda Henderson, who reported seizures of $382 from her credit 
union account in one day and $185 from a single paycheck; Miranda Jones, who 
described a seizure of $800 from her bank account in one instance; Dora Byrd, who 
lost $645 in a single seizure from her bank account; Rosalyn Turner, who lost about 
$300 a month to a garnishment; and Cori Winfield, who had almost $250 seized from 
her pay every two weeks). 
 132. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (discussing the CCPA’s silence on bank 
account seizures). 
 133. See id. (commenting on the “punishing” nature of collectors’ actions to empty 
a bank account, and noting that few states have regulations that will automatically 
protect minimum amounts of funds in a debtor’s bank account). 
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garnishment.134  However, like the FDCPA, the CCPA leaves debtors 
with the burden of asserting one of the exceptions outlined above to 
“protect their assets.”135 
3. The regulatory environment for debt collection in Missouri 
Missouri currently has very few state statutes or regulations that 
specifically address debt-collection practices.136  Accordingly, any 
debt-collection action commenced in Missouri is governed primarily 
by the general Missouri Revised Statutes and the FDCPA.137  Under 
Missouri law, a judgment-creditor may legally garnish 25% of a 
debtor’s disposable income.138  The Missouri Revised Statutes state 
that the minimum rate of interest to be attached to a judgment is 9% 
yearly, but judgment-creditors are also legally allowed to set the post-
judgment interest rate on the debt at the rate set forth in the contract 
extending the original credit to the judgment-debtor.139  The effect of 
high post-judgment interest rates is a form of “exploding debt,” 
which a judge in the St. Louis area has likened to “indentured 
servitude.”140  Debts that originated in the hundreds of dollars can 
                                                     
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b). 
 135. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4. 
 136. The “Debt Collection” page of the Missouri Division of Finance’s website 
displays the following language:  “Missouri does not regulate collection agencies; 
however, these companies do need to comply with the Federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act.”  Debt Collection, MO. DIV. OF FIN., http://finance.mo.gov/consumers/ 
debt_collection.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).  The website’s message concludes, 
“Further information can be found on the Federal Trade Commission’s Web site at 
http://www.ftc.gov.”  Id. 
 137. This statutory framework means that debt collectors in Missouri still must 
adhere to the notice, communication, and validation requirements in the FDCPA.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 109–15 (covering the requirements of the FDCPA). 
 138. Wage Garnishment, ST. LOUIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., http://www.stlouisco.com 
/LawandPublicSafety/CircuitCourt/SheriffsOffice/WageGarnishmentInformation 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016); see also Paul Kiel, Loan Amounts Can Snowball When Payday 
Lenders Sue Borrowers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/loan-amounts-can-snowball-when-payday-
lenders-sue-borrowers/article_4032d388-609a-5e5b-8812-9bd67c50fb85.html 
(observing that twenty states allow debt collectors to garnish up to 25% of a borrower’s 
paycheck, while only four states prohibit wage garnishment for most types of debt). 
 139. MO. REV. STAT. § 408.040(2) (2015). 
 140. Kiel, supra note 138 (describing a debtor who paid $3573 towards his $400 
debt over the course of seven years but still owed $16,000 due to interest accruing over 
that period); see also Ian Liberty, Note, From Debt Collection to Debt Slavery:  How the Modern 
Practice of Debt Collection Is a Violation of the 13th Amendment’s Prohibition on Involuntary 
Servitude, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 281, 308 (2014) (analogizing modern debt 
collection with Civil War-era practices of slavery and indentured servitude). 
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quickly “balloon” to tens of thousands of dollars.141  One debtor, for 
instance, saw a $1000 loan grow to over $40,000 of debt in only a five 
year period.142  When faced with a debt of such immense proportions, 
a debtor’s options become severely limited:  declare bankruptcy or 
“make payments for . . . life.”143 
The Missouri Revised Statutes do contain a head-of-household 
exemption that limits the amount that can be garnished from a 
debtor’s wages.144  Under the exemption, a debtor qualifying as the 
head of a household can reduce the amount garnished to 10% of his 
or her income, protecting 90% of the income that the primary, 
oftentimes sole, wage earner of a family earns.145  That 10% cap is the 
maximum amount that can be garnished from any individual 
paycheck even when multiple judgment-creditors are entitled to 
payment.146  The burden of asserting this protection falls on the 
judgment-debtor, who must file an affidavit with the court asserting 
his or her status as the head of a family.147 
Public entities in Missouri have implemented policies that, while 
not as authoritative as statutes, afford protections to low-income 
debtors.148  The public water utility, MSD,149 has a program for low-
income customers to reduce their payments, similar to the reductions 
                                                     
 141. Paul Kiel, What Can Be Done Right Now to Fix the Legal System for Debt Collection, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/what-can-
be-done-to-fix-the-debt-collection-right-now. 
 142. Kiel, supra note 138. 
 143. Id. 
 144. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.440 (“Each head of a family may select and hold, 
exempt from execution, . . .  wages, not exceeding in value the amount of [$1250] 
plus [$350] for each of such person’s unmarried dependent children under the age 
of twenty-one years or dependent . . . except ten percent of any debt, income, salary 
or wages due such head of a family.”); see also Wage Garnishment, supra note 138 (“For 
the primary or sole wage earner of a family, 90% of his or her income is protected 
from garnishment.”). 
 145. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.440. 
 146. Wage Garnishment, supra note 138. 
 147. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (referring to the burden that falls on debtors 
to protect their assets); Affidavit for Head of Family Exemption of Wages Garnishment, MO. 
CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=58441 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 148. See, e.g., Billing FAQs, METRO. ST. LOUIS SEWER DIST., 
http://www.stlmsd.com/msd-faqs/billing-faqs (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 149. MSD “dramatically increased” the volume of suits it filed for collecting debts 
from 3000 in 2010 to 11,000 in 2012.  Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.  The suits, 
generally for small debts, were mostly filed against consumers in majority black 
communities despite the fact that most of MSD’s customers are white.  Id. 
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provided under the head-of-household exemption.150  Again, 
however, the burden of claiming such a reduction lies with the 
debtor.151  In 2015, MSD estimated that 39,000 customers were 
potentially eligible for the reduction, but as of June 2015, only 2300 
were enrolled in the program, meaning only about 5% of customers 
had taken advantage of the program.152 
In searching for a remedy to unfair debt-collection practices, 
consumers in Missouri have attempted to use the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Act (“MPA”).153  The applicable provisions 
of the MPA protect consumers against fraud, deception, and unfair 
practices.154  The MPA provides that “[a]ny person who purchases or 
leases merchandise . . . and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss . . . may 
bring a private civil action . . . to recover actual damages.”155  Despite 
its seemingly broad scope, courts have interpreted the MPA’s use of 
the word “merchandise” to limit consumers’ ability to apply the 
statute to third-party debt-collection actions.  In private actions 
brought under the MPA, courts have required a connection between 
the unfair or deceptive practice and the original transaction.156  While 
                                                     
 150. Billing FAQs, supra note 148.  MSD’s Customer Assistance program offers 
reduced rates for low-income residents who own or rent the property for which they 
are applying for a reduction.  Id.  The reduction equals 50% of the current charges 
for wastewater and storm water services on a customer’s monthly sewer bill.  Id. 
 151. Id.  To receive a reduced rate, a customer must apply by completing an 
application and submitting it to MSD.  Id.  Applications are only available after 
placing a request via phone to MSD.  Id.  Reduced rates are only valid for a one-year 
period at which time a new application is required to reapply.  Id. 
 152. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (adding that MSD was “not satisfied with [the] 
level of enrollment”). 
 153. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.1610 (2016).  The Missouri General Assembly 
enacted the law in 1967 to provide a statutory cause of action to protect consumers 
and to codify the common law remedies for deceptive practices.  Jeremy Gogel, 
Remedies (and Lack Thereof) for Victims of Abusive Debt Collection Practices, 66 J. MO. B. 
330, 333–34 (2010); see also State ex rel. Danforth v. Indep. Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 
362, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (“In order to give broad scope to the statutory 
protection and to prevent ease of evasion because of overly meticulous definitions, 
many of these laws such as the Missouri statute ‘do not attempt to define deceptive 
practices or fraud, but merely declare unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
unlawful . . . ,’ leaving it to the court in each particular instance to declare whether 
fair dealing has been violated.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 154. MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020(1). 
 155. Id. § 407.025(1) (emphasis added). 
 156. See State ex rel. Koster v. Prof’l Debt Mgmt., LLC, 351 S.W.3d 668, 670–71 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing an action for failure to state a claim because the 
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MPA”) does not extend to unfair or 
deceptive debt-collection practices by a third-party collector who was not a 
participant in the original consumer transaction and the actions occurred after the 
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the statute contains the language “before, during or after the sale,” 
courts have read this language as a mere modification of the 
requirement that an unfair practice be connected to a sale or 
merchandise, not as an extension to interactions with third parties.157  
As a result of this narrow interpretation, the MPA does not reach a 
third-party collector, such as a debt buyer or a collection agency, 
“who ha[s] no other involvement with the . . . transaction” past 
purchasing the defaulted debt from the original creditor.158 
D. The Evolution of Procedural Due Process and Garnishment Actions 
Debt collection practices in Missouri illustrate the complex process 
through which a debt results in a garnishment.  Garnishments, 
however, raise procedural due process questions because the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect against 
the “deprivation of life, liberty or property.”159  Courts have found 
that these constitutional amendments provide individuals facing 
deprivations with the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 
                                                     
initial sale of merchandise); Lavender v. Wolpoff & Ambramson, LLP, No. 07-0015-
CV-W-FJG, 2007 WL 2507752, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing a deceptive 
practices claim against a debt-collection law firm under the MPA when debtors could 
not establish they were clients or customers of the debt collectors, and the debt 
collectors never sold any goods or merchandise or provided any services to debtors).  
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently extended the protections of the MPA to the 
mortgage-loan context, but both a Missouri appellate court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have declined to extend that holding to two cases 
involving third-party debt collectors.  Compare Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 
S.W.3d 410, 412, 415–17 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (limiting the holding in Koster by 
finding that a loan servicer and a mortgagee’s assignee undertook unfair actions 
enforcing the terms of a mortgage loan “in connection with” the original loan 
transaction under the MPA, even though the servicer and assignee were not parties 
to the original loan transaction), with Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 
892, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that Conway does not apply to a trustee, but a 
foreclosure may be “in connection with” a sale under the MPA when the debtors 
were informed that modification of a loan would suspend a foreclosure), and Geran 
v. Xerox Educ. Servs., Inc., 469 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (declining to 
extend Conway to a loan servicer’s actions regarding repayment for a loan because a 
schedule modification is not “in connection with” a sale under the MPA). 
 157. MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020(1) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Koster, 351 S.W.3d at 
674 (“We are not persuaded that actions occurring after the initial sales transaction, 
which do not relate to any claims or representations made before or at the time of 
the initial sales transaction, and which are taken by a person who is not a party to the 
initial sales transaction, are made ‘in connection with’ the sale or advertisement of 
merchandise as required by the MPA.”). 
 158. Koster, 351 S.W.3d at 674; Gogel, supra note 153, at 334. 
 159. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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“appropriate to the nature of the case.”160  Due process protections 
ensure the right to be heard—a right that can only be enjoyed when 
the person facing a deprivation has received meaningful and 
reasonable notice of the opportunity to be heard.161  The United 
States Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence in a line of cases 
ending in Mathews v. Eldridge, the seminal case that established the 
analysis necessary to ensure due process prior to a deprivation of 
property.162  Around the same time period, the Court was reviewing 
the procedural due process required in cases regarding prejudgment 
seizures of property.  In the 1990s, when the Court ruled again on the 
constitutionality of prejudgment seizures of property in Connecticut v. 
Doehr,163 the Court relied on both series of cases to develop a 
modified test for due process. 
1. Procedural due process and Supreme Court doctrine 
When the government infringes on constitutionally protected 
interests, the right to procedural due process assures that a person 
has a right to a meaningful prior hearing.  In Goldberg v. Kelly,164 the 
Court laid out the analysis for determining what process is due when 
a constitutionally protected interest is at stake.165  The question in 
Goldberg revolved around whether a state had to provide a recipient of 
public welfare benefits with a hearing before terminating those 
benefits.166  The Court held that due process entitled the recipient to 
a pre-termination hearing during which the recipient could appear in 
                                                     
 160. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  The 
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment specifies that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fifth 
Amendment applies to the actions of the federal government, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies due process protections to state actions. 
 161. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914)).  “The purpose of this requirement . . . is to protect [a person’s] use and 
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize substantively 
unfair or mistaken deprivations of property . . . .”  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–
81 (1972) (holding pre-judgment replevin statutes to be unconstitutional absent a 
prior hearing). 
 162. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (establishing a three-part 
balancing test to address procedural requirements when the government potentially 
deprives a party of his or her property). 
 163. 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 164. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 165. Id. at 255. 
 166. Id. 
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person and offer oral evidence to support his claims.167  Key to the 
Goldberg opinion is the assertion that the threat of a “grievous loss” of 
a property interest demands special protections and requires courts 
to balance unjust deprivation of property with the government’s 
interest in resolving the matter.168 
A few years later, in Board of Regents v. Roth,169 the Court continued 
its examination of how to evaluate due process deprivations.170  In 
Roth, a professor without tenure rights alleged that the state university 
violated his due process rights when they provided notice, but not a 
hearing, regarding his termination.171  The Court created a two-part 
analysis where it first determined whether there was a constitutionally 
protected interest and then—only upon a positive finding—
determined what process was due to protect that interest.172 
In Mathews, the Court reviewed the termination of a person’s social 
security disability benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing.173  The 
Court held that the extensive administrative procedures in place 
ensured that due process requirements were met.174  In its holding, 
the Court established a balancing test for the consideration of the 
different interests at play.  The Mathews test balances three factors: 
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entail.175 
                                                     
 167. Id. at 266–71. 
 168. Id. at 262 n.8, 263–64. 
 169. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 170. Id. at 569–72. 
 171. Id. at 566–69. 
 172. Id. at 570–72; see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is 
determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.”); Perry 
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (deciding the case alongside Roth); Cafeteria & 
Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (holding that in 
determining what procedures are required under a particular set of circumstances, a 
court must identify the governmental function and private interests involved). 
 173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). 
 174. Id. at 349. 
 175. Id. at 334–35. 
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Both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have used the Mathews 
test in myriad applications since it was established,176 eventually 
applying it to find pre-judgment garnishments unconstitutional.177 
2. The unconstitutionality of pre-judgment garnishment statutes 
The Supreme Court, in a string of cases from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s, established the minimum procedural due process 
protections required before a debt collector can secure payment 
from debtors through a private lawsuit.178  The cases work in a slightly 
disjunctive fashion to create a framework for the process that is due 
when property is seized prior to a judgment.179  Notably, the Supreme 
Court decided these cases during the “peak of the welfare rights 
movement,” when the Court stressed the importance of fair legal 
standards for indigent populations, and this reasoning continued 
through the Sniadach tetrad.180  The Court’s procedural due process 
analyses in Goldberg, Roth, and ultimately in Mathews, parallels the 
                                                     
 176. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011) (determining 
whether counsel is required in a civil contempt proceeding); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (establishing the process required for a United States citizen 
held as an enemy combatant); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 431–32 (1979) 
(requiring a higher standard of proof in a commitment case for mental illness to 
meet due process demands). 
 177. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (using a modified version of 
the Mathews test to conduct a due process analysis). 
 178. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Mitchell v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–42 (1969). 
 179. Linda Beale, Note, Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values:  
The Sniadach Tetrad Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1603, 1603 (1994) (“When the 
Supreme Court addressed the prejudgment remedy case of Connecticut v. Doehr . . . , it 
grappled with the Sniadach tetrad, a line of precedent that meandered across the due 
process constitutional law landscape leaving a trail of invalidated state statutes and 
confused lower courts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 180. Id. at 1641; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (deciding 
that a statute requiring payment of fees for divorce proceedings violated due process 
of indigents); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971) (ruling that a state statute 
converting court fines to incarceration violated the constitutional rights of 
indigents); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (protecting government 
benefit recipients from termination of benefits absent an in-person hearing); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (invalidating three state statutes that 
required a one-year waiting period for new residents applying for welfare benefits); 
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (relying on the Equal 
Protection Clause to overturn a poll tax voting requirement as discriminatory against 
indigents); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that fair 
procedure requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent challenging the 
certification that an appeal is taken in good faith). 
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procedural due process analysis in the cases involving private debt 
collection lawsuits:  the Sniadach tetrad181 and Connecticut v. Doehr. 
a. The Sniadach Tetrad 
The Court first discussed the constitutionality of a pre-judgment 
garnishment in the context of private suits in Sniadach v. Family 
Finance Corp.182  In Sniadach, a creditor in Wisconsin brought a 
garnishment action against a debtor and her employer as garnishee, 
and the debtor moved to dismiss on the grounds that the 
proceedings violated her due process rights.183  Under the Wisconsin 
statute governing garnishment procedure, a complainant could begin 
the process for an in rem seizure of the debtor’s wages solely by 
requesting the court clerk to issue a summons and serving the 
summons and the complaint upon the debtor.184  The debtor’s wages 
would then remain frozen until the matter was resolved.185  The Court 
found a procedural due process violation in the garnishment 
action.186  Although the creditor had provided the debtor with 
statutorily adequate notice through service of summons, the Court 
found that the creditor had not provided constitutionally adequate 
notice, and that the debtor did not have the opportunity to be heard 
prior to the seizure.187 
During this time, the Court addressed the disadvantages that the 
poor faced in the legal system and established extra protections for 
indigent parties.188  The ruling in Sniadach was consistent with several 
other Supreme Court decisions from the period.  The Court’s 
reasoning in Sniadach emphasized that wages are a “specialized” 
property interest for which unjust garnishment can lead to uniquely 
detrimental consequences.189  Under this reasoning, the Court created 
                                                     
 181. The Sniadach tetrad refers to a series of four cases:  Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 
601 (1975).  Beale, supra note 179, at 1603 & n.3. 
 182. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). 
 183. Id. at 337–38. 
 184. Id. at 338–39. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 342 (“Where the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it needs no 
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this 
prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due 
process.” (citation omitted)). 
 187. Id. at 340. 
 188. See Beale, supra note 179, at 1609–10; supra note 180. 
 189. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340 (“We deal here with wages—a specialized type of 
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.”). 
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a “hardship” exception to the procedural due process doctrine.190  The 
Court designed this exception to heavily favor indigent debtors 
because it recognized that such individuals can suffer “grave injustices” 
from even a temporary deprivation of wages.191 
A few years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,192 the Court struck down 
statutes for prejudgment replevin in Florida and Pennsylvania.193  The 
debtors in the consolidated cases were consumers who had purchased 
household items under conditional sales contracts, and in each case 
the sellers later obtained summary writs of replevin to recollect on 
the items after late payments or disputes arose.194  The Florida statute 
authorized a state agent to seize property after a court clerk issued a 
writ of replevin based on a creditor’s ability to “fill in the blanks” on a 
form and post a security bond.195  The statute did require the initiator 
of the replevin action to commence an action for repossession at a 
later date.196  In Pennsylvania, a claimant could make a similarly basic 
application for a writ of replevin, but that statute did not require a 
hearing on the merits of the repossession.197 
The Court found that both statutes lacked procedural due process 
protections because neither provided adequate notice nor the 
opportunity for a “meaningful” hearing before allowing collectors to 
seize the property.198  The debtor would only receive notice of the 
claim at the same moment the items were seized from her.199  Each 
state’s procedures allowed courts to issue writs on “bare assertion[s],” 
and Pennsylvania did not even require that courts provide an 
eventual hearing.200 
Relying on Sniadach, the Court found that even though the seizures 
were temporary in nature, a “nonfinal” deprivation was still a 
                                                     
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 340; see Beale, supra note 179, at 1608 (noting the tremendous leverage 
creditors would gain over debtors in collecting the alleged debt). 
 192. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 193. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96–97. 
 194. Id. at 70–71.  One of the appellants in the case had a more “bizarre” 
experience—Rosa Washington’s former husband, a local deputy sheriff, had 
obtained a writ in order to seize all of their son’s belongings while the former couple 
battled over custody.  Id. at 72. 
 195. Id. at 70–71, 73–74 (noting that the Florida statute did not require an applicant 
to make a “convincing showing” that he or she had a claim to the goods in question). 
 196. Id. at 75. 
 197. Id. at 77–78. 
 198. Id. at 69–70, 75, 80–81. 
 199. Id. at 80–81. 
 200. Id. at 74, 77. 
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deprivation under the due process requirements.201  The Court also 
acknowledged that the debtors did not have full legal title to the 
goods under the conditional sales contracts but dismissed that fact as 
irrelevant.202  At stake was the debtors’ property interest in continued 
possession and use of the goods, and the matter of the “ultimate” 
right to continued possession would require a later hearing.203 
The Court then also rejected a narrow reading of both Sniadach 
and Goldberg that limited procedural due process protections to items 
of necessity, instead stating that those cases did not restrict 
procedural due process guarantees to only wages or welfare 
benefits.204  Stating that “a bed may be equally essential . . . for human 
beings in their day-to-day lives,” the Court reaffirmed that “property” 
is not a narrowly defined concept under due process.205 
Following quickly after Fuentes, the Court moved in a seemingly 
different direction with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.206  In Mitchell, a 
creditor obtained a writ of sequestration on goods it sold to the 
debtor and the debtor challenged that the writ violated his due 
process rights.207  The creditor alleged that he had a vendor’s lien on 
the goods, and that the debtor had defaulted on payments.208  The 
Louisiana statute at issue provided a writ of sequestration based on a 
verified application to a judge when a creditor could prove a right to 
possession, such as through a lien.209  But the statute also included 
some protections for debtors.  It cautioned against the writ being 
conclusive on the issue of ownership by providing the debtor the 
opportunity for a hearing to dissolve the writ if the creditor failed to 
verify the validity of the information provided in the affidavit.210  It 
also called for an immediate post-seizure hearing, bond processes for 
both the creditor and the debtor to seek attachments, and judicial 
oversight of the entire process.211 
In balancing the interests of the debtor and the creditor, the Court 
found that both parties had a substantial interest in the property at 
                                                     
 201. Id. at 85. 
 202. Id. at 86–88. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 88–90. 
 205. Id. at 90. 
 206. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 207. Id. at 601–03. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 605–06. 
 210. Id. at 606–07. 
 211. See id. at 608, 611, 613, 626. 
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stake.212  The Court upheld the statute, finding the creditor’s interest 
ultimately outweighed the imposition on the debtor.213  Further, the 
Court found that the statute’s procedural protections had provided 
adequate “constitutional accommodation[s]” for the debtor against 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation.214 
The Mitchell Court distinguished the facts before it from Sniadach 
and Fuentes in several notable ways.  First, the nature of the interest at 
stake in Mitchell was significantly different from the interest at stake in 
Sniadach.215  In Sniadach, the creditor never previously held a property 
interest in the debtor’s wages prior to the garnishment action, whereas 
in Mitchell the creditor did hold a property interest in the relevant 
goods because it was collecting on a vendor’s lien from a sale of those 
goods.216  Second, the Court weighed the differences between a 
permanent seizure absent an opportunity to be heard and a temporary 
seizure that takes place prior to a hearing, determining that even if the 
deprivation in Mitchell was temporary and not permanent as that in 
Sniadach, Fuentes still established that even “nonfinal” deprivations 
require appropriate procedure.217  Third, where the statutes in 
Sniadach and Fuentes contained no measures for judicial oversight, the 
statute as issue in Mitchell provided for and required certain court 
procedures, which the Court ruled created “alternative safeguards” 
that provided adequate due process to both parties.218 
The Mitchell Court, however, declined to formulate a bright-line 
rule regarding the deprivation of property, temporary or not, prior to 
a hearing.219  In doing so, the Court found an “alternative safeguards” 
exception to the hardship exception it established in Sniadach, where it 
required a hearing prior to deprivation of property.220  Noting the 
importance of the distinction between garnishing wages and 
recovering personal property that had been sold, the Court found that 
                                                     
 212. Id. at 607–10. 
 213. Id. at 607–08, 618. 
 214. Id. at 607. 
 215. Beale, supra note 179, at 1618. 
 216. Id. at 1617–19.  Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 
(1969) (stating that a person has a stronger interest in wages that they earn), with 
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 610 (arguing that a vendor has an equally strong interest in 
loaned property to which he previously had title). 
 217. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 609–10; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74–75 (1972); 
Beale, supra note 179, at 1619. 
 218. Beale, supra note 179, at 1618. 
 219. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91–93; Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341. 
 220. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86; Beale, supra note 179, at 1620. 
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the statutory provision of adequate oversight by the judicial system in 
Mitchell ensured that the due process requirements were met.221 
The Court’s decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 
Inc.222 the following year further complicated its stance on due 
process requirements in a private seizure action.223  The facts in Di-
Chem were analogous to those in Sniadach, with a creditor in Georgia 
seeking to garnish the debtor’s wages to satisfy a debt on goods 
sold.224  The Georgia garnishment statute allowed the creditor to seek 
a garnishment order so long as the garnishment order was filed 
concurrently with an indebtedness action.225  Based on an affidavit 
from the creditor asserting the debt, the court clerk issued a 
summons of garnishment.226  The Court found that the statute 
violated the debtor’s procedural due process rights because the 
statute allowed the garnishment based only on the creditor’s 
assertions filed with a clerk, not a judge.227  Further, the garnishment 
did not allow for a hearing to resolve the matter of possession prior 
to resolution of the litigation.228 
The Court’s reasoning drew on all three of the previous cases on 
property deprivation in a private action.  The Court disregarded the 
lower court’s interpretation of Sniadach as a “carve[d] out . . . 
exception” for wage earners, chiding the lower court for failing to 
consider the holding in Fuentes in its reasoning.229  The Court 
reiterated the rule in Fuentes, that whether a debtor is entitled to a 
hearing does not hinge on the length or severity of a deprivation of 
property rights, even when those rights are merely for use and 
possession of the property at issue.230  Lastly, the Court determined 
that the Georgia statute contained none of the judicial safeguards 
found in the statute in Mitchell, such as review of the order by a judge 
and the availability of a hearing immediately after the seizure.231  The 
Court did not revisit the issue of balancing creditor and debtor 
interests in private collection suits until the 1990s in Connecticut v. 
Doehr. 
                                                     
 221. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 610; Beale, supra note 179, at 1618. 
 222. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). 
 223. Id. at 608. 
 224. Id. at 604. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227.  Id. at 606–07. 
 228. Id. at 607. 
 229. Id. at 605–06. 
 230. Id. at 606. 
 231. Id. at 607; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606 (1974). 
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b. Connecticut v. Doehr:  Updated procedural due process 
requirements for pre-judgment garnishment actions 
The Court ruled again on the constitutionality of a state statute 
that permitted creditors to attach property before obtaining a 
judgment in Connecticut v. Doehr.232  The question in Doehr was what 
procedures a state statute had to contain when a creditor utilized the 
justice system to deprive a debtor of their property through pre-
judgment attachment.233  As it did in Di-Chem, the Court looked at the 
relevant statute for judicial safeguards similar to those present in 
Mitchell, regarding the existence of such protections as a significant 
factor for upholding the statute because they would indicate 
sufficient due process protection.234 
In its decision in Doehr, the Court acknowledged that due process, 
“unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”235  Guided by 
this instruction that courts may incorporate flexibility into a due 
process analysis, the Doehr Court applied a modified version of the 
Mathews test.236  The key difference between the version of the test 
applied in Doehr and that applied in Mathews was the Court’s focus on 
the interest of the private party seeking the attachment (the 
creditor), instead of the government’s interest.237  In Doehr, the court 
looked with “due regard [at] any ancillary interest the government 
may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden 
of providing greater protections.”238 
                                                     
 232. 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991).  Under the statute at issue in Doehr, creditors could 
attach the debtor’s property based solely on a verified oath from the creditor 
demonstrating probable cause of a valid claim.  Id. at 7.  Attachment did not require 
prior notice or a hearing.  Id. at 4.  The debtor in Doehr never received service of the 
complaint or notice of the attachment until the sheriff actually attached the 
property.  Beale, supra note 179, at 1628. 
 233. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 9. 
 234. Id. at 10.  The Doehr Court noted that in Mitchell, the statute provided for an 
immediate post-deprivation hearing in addition to potential damages; a judge was 
required to determine whether the creditor provided a “clear showing of entitlement 
to the writ” and that the required affidavit provided adequate detail.  Id.; Beale, supra 
note 179, at 1629. 
 235. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 236. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.  The traditional application of the Mathews test applies to 
a deprivation by the state of a state entitlement.  Id.  The facts in Doehr were found to 
meet the requirement for state action that triggers a due process analysis.  Id. at 10–11. 
 237. Beale, supra note 179, at 1630. 
 238. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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Of note, the deprivation at risk in Doehr was neither a complete 
physical deprivation nor a permanent deprivation.239  The Court also 
highlighted that the “one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory 
submissions” the creditor had submitted in seeking an attachment were 
likely to lead to an erroneous deprivation absent effective judicial 
review.240  In looking at what protections the statute did offer for 
debtors, the Court identified post-attachment notice and hearing, in 
addition to possible double damages for the aggrieved party if the 
lawsuit was commenced absent probable cause.241  However, the Court 
also found that certain factors present in Mitchell were not present in 
Doehr, including the creditor’s preexisting property interest and that the 
claim for a vendor’s lien necessarily included documents demonstrating 
the creditor’s interest.242  The Court held that if the creditor was only 
seeking to guarantee the availability of the attached assets in the event 
that he secured a judgment, the creditor’s interest in the property could 
not “justify the burdening” of the debtor’s interest.243  The emphasis that 
the Court placed on whether a creditor has a preexisting property right 
was substantial, as it was included in two prongs of the Mathews test:  
determining the importance of the creditor’s interest and ensuring 
the validity of the lawsuits outcome.244 
                                                     
 239. Id. at 12 (“[E]ven the temporary or partial impairments to property rights 
that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due 
process protection.”); see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1631 (“The attachment [in 
Doehr] may be less injurious than a temporary deprivation of necessary household 
goods and wages.”). 
 240. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14; see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1631 n.218 
(“[A]uthoriz[ing] attachment merely because the plaintiff believes the defendant is 
liable, or because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid complaint, would permit 
the deprivation of the defendant’s property when the claim . . . rested on factual 
allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defendant 
would dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). 
 241. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13–14. 
 242. Id. at 15; see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1632 n.220 (noting the ambiguity in 
the Doehr Court’s reasoning when it did not elaborate on what protections are 
required to uphold the constitutionality of a statute). 
 243. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16. 
 244. Id.  The Court also found a historical underpinning for its argument:  the 
“Custom of London” entitled plaintiffs to attach property only when the satisfaction 
of a judgment was threatened by a defendant’s actions.  Id. at 16–17. 
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II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO POST-JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
GARNISHMENT IN MISSOURI 
The Supreme Court established that due process requires 
adjudication that is preceded by notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, as “appropriate to the nature of the case.”245  In relation to 
post-judgment garnishments in Missouri, a court must first establish 
that a protected interest exists.246  Upon finding a constitutionally 
protected interest, a court can then determine whether the due 
process protections that a statute provides are adequate.247 
A. Improperly Garnished Wages in Missouri Are a Constitutionally Protected 
Property Interest 
To invoke a due process protection analysis, a debtor must 
establish that he or she was deprived of “life, liberty, or property.”248  
The question that invariably arises for a debtor invoking a due 
process analysis is, “What qualifies as a constitutionally protected 
interest?”249  While there is a potential claim that garnishment 
deprives debtors of a liberty interest,250 the stronger and more viable 
argument in Missouri is that wage garnishment deprives debtors of 
“property.”  Unrestrained access to funds to which a debtor is legally 
entitled creates a clear and substantial property interest.251  Because 
judgment-creditors may legally seek up to a quarter of any individual 
paycheck and can sometimes seize an entire bank account, the 
                                                     
 245. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also 
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (supporting adjudication on a 
case-by-case basis when determining the constitutionality of attachment statutes); 
Beale, supra note 179, at 1637. 
 246. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (“When protected 
interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
 249. Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property”, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 
410 (1977). 
 250. A debtor in Missouri could potentially frame the argument as a deprivation 
of a liberty interest given the hardships that garnishment imposes on a person’s 
livelihood.  See generally Liberty, supra note 140, at 284 (identifying the modern debt-
collection industry’s similarities with “the system of state facilitated peonage” in the 
post-Civil War South, which presents a modern violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment).  That argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 251. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a “very 
compelling” debtor interest in funds for subsistence). 
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judgment-debtor can be unjustly deprived of his own funds and can 
quickly lose the ability to “cover basic living expenses.”252 
Much like the special protections that may be required for certain 
property interests, as noted in Goldberg, the funds to which judgment-
debtors are legally entitled require more safeguarding than current 
process affords.253  Although no absolute ownership interest inheres 
in funds a person expends and currently owes to a debt collector, the 
key distinction that creates a protected interest is that in many cases 
the judgment-debtor is legally entitled to the funds garnished by the 
judgment-creditor.254  For instance, a debt collector may enter a time-
barred claim, fail to validate and verify the debtor’s ownership of the 
debt, improperly communicate notice to the debtor, or make any 
number of the violations that debt collectors routinely commit.255  In 
the alternative, a judgment-debtor may qualify for an exemption that 
affords statutory protection from garnishment to a portion of their 
wages.256  When a debtor is legally entitled to retain even a portion of 
their funds under any of the reasoning above, a garnishment deprives 
that debtor of a legitimate and substantial interest in her property. 
The ills felt by low-income Missourians who are burdened with a 
garnishment are of the same sort as the problems that facilitated the 
discussion in Sniadach.257  Data demonstrates that courts typically 
impose the highest rates of garnishments on earners in the $25,000-
                                                     
 252. See Kiel, supra note 138 (hearing from a debtor who had allegedly accrued 
$40,000 in debt, almost exclusively in interest, and faced the grim prospects of either 
declaring bankruptcy or making payments for the rest of her life); supra notes 132–
33 (reviewing the ability of debt collectors to legally wipe out an entire bank account 
under current federal law). 
 253. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (“The extent to which 
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to 
which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss’ . . . .”). 
 254. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (highlighting the common judgment-
creditor practice of instituting suits barred by the applicable statute of limitations to 
capitalize on the typical debtor’s lack of legal counsel). 
 255. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text (listing the litigation strategies 
of debt buyers that result in wrongful debt-collection suits being filed). 
 256. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (describing the Missouri head-
of-household exemption).  But see infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text (noting 
that the lack of information provided to debtors regarding exemptions is a cause of 
their underutilization). 
 257. In the St. Louis area specifically, “generations of discrimination” have limited 
low-income black families’ access to the range of resources one turns to when faced 
with a financial downturn.  See FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 7 (grappling with 
the violence in St. Louis that, in part, finds its origin in the cycle of economic poverty 
in the region); Editorial Board, supra note 1; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“I’m in a 
generational hole.”). 
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$40,000 range, and that garnishment rates are high even in the lower 
income brackets.258  When a person’s income falls in a lower bracket, 
the bulk of their income goes towards “basic necessities,” such as 
rent, food, and utilities.259  Adding garnishment to the equation 
forces a debtor even further into the proverbial hole and “hits [the] 
household budget like a bomb.”260  The Court in Sniadach focused on 
the “grave injustices” that result when creditors garnish a 
“specialized” property prior to a debtor’s opportunity to be heard.261  
In Sniadach, the Court recognized that indigent populations with 
little to no access to legal aid feel certain property interest 
deprivations far more acutely than their higher-income 
counterparts.262  The deprivation of the interest at stake is 
exacerbated by the extreme harm to a household that results when a 
low-income judgment-debtor in Missouri is deprived of funds to 
which she should legally retain access. 
B. Debt Collection Practices in Missouri Deny Low-Income Communities 
Adequate Notice and the Opportunity to Be Heard 
The current patchwork of laws governing Missouri debt-collection 
practices, both in and out of the courtroom, lack the adequate 
procedural due process safeguards to protect debtors from low-
income communities.  Unfortunately, it is precisely these 
communities that are subject to the majority of judgments in debt-
collection suits.263  Further, in the greater St. Louis area, low-income 
mostly black communities find themselves far more afflicted by debt-
collection judgments and garnishments than their non-black majority 
counterparts.264  Debt collectors have evaded due process 
requirements to provide adequate notice of the claims or the 
protections to which debtors are entitled, as well as to provide an 
opportunity to be heard, in part due to ingrained societal blocks for 
low-income families to access to counsel and legal advice.265 
                                                     
 258. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 264. See supra Section I.A (covering the economic and societal ills black 
communities in St. Louis face and the burdens that mount when debt-collection 
judgments result in the garnishment of wages). 
 265. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“There’s no more income, there’s no 
more savings, and the options are pretty limited, because you don’t have the social 
network, you don’t have the legal . . . resources available to you to find a solution.”). 
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1. Inadequate notice 
Together, both the FDCPA and Missouri law fail to ensure that low-
income households receive constitutionally adequate notice of debt-
collection suits.266  When Missouri courts adjudicate the sufficiency of 
notice in a debt-collection law suit, they refer to either to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure267 or to the Missouri court rules that govern 
the service of summons.268  The application of standard federal or 
state service requirements becomes problematic when debtors rarely 
remain in the same residence they were living in when they first 
incurred the debt.269  Moreover, residents are oftentimes forced to 
move from home to home for reasons beyond their control, such as 
escalating violence or habitability concerns.270  Judgment-debtors in 
the St. Louis area report never receiving service on the debt-
collection suits brought against them.271  Much like the case in 
Fuentes, where the debtor did not receive notice of the action until 
the actual seizure of property, some debtors in St. Louis may not even 
                                                     
 266. While related, the issue of providing debtors notice via service of process is 
distinct from the legal requirements of the FDCPA that regulate debt collectors’ 
provision of a validation notice to consumers over the collection of debt; however, 
similar concerns arise in both instances regarding verification of who the debt 
actually belongs to.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012); supra Section I.A.1 (reviewing the 
statutory requirements of the FDCPA); see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449–
50 (1982) (holding that the opportunity to be heard is only as effective as the notice 
preceding it, and establishing that service of process requires notice to be 
“reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”); 
Johnny Parker, The Search for Meaning in the Notice Requirements of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act:  A 30 for 30 Short, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 201 (2015) (assessing the 
protections afforded to consumers under the validation of debts section of the 
FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g). 
 267. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (dictating the required procedures for effecting service 
of an original complaint). 
 268. MO. R. R.C.P. §§ 54.01–54.22 (2016). 
 269. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (discussing four separate residents of the St. 
Louis area, each of whom have had to move since their initial encounters with 
creditors or debt collectors).  Rapidly changing where one lives introduces new 
complications into a court’s analysis of whether service has been effected on the 
proper place of residence.  See Nat’l Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 
257 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 270. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 271. The demonstrated lack of awareness that debtors have that a suit has been 
levied against them indicates that service has not been reasonably calculated to 
provide adequate notice under Greene.  See Greene, 456 U.S. at 451; Kiel & Arnold, 
supra note 4 (reporting on a couple whose court file reflects that a summons was left 
at their current house, even though the house was uninhabited and undergoing 
renovations at the time). 
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know that a court has rendered a judgment against them until they 
begin to see a deduction in their paycheck.272  The current federal 
and state procedures governing service of process fail to adequately 
account for the particularized housing circumstances that plague 
many low-income communities in St. Louis. 
Debt collectors’ failure to adhere to the validation requirements of 
the FDCPA also contributes to the problem of inadequate notice.273  
Under the FDCPA, debt collectors must validate a debt in a written 
notice to the debtor prior to engaging in any collection activities.274  
If debt collectors do not provide such validation notices, they are 
already engaging in unfair practices for which they could be held 
liable.275  If debt collectors were to comply with the FDCPA’s 
provision on validation, they would be placing debtors on 
constructive notice that the debts were in collection, thereby partially 
alleviating the concerns that arise during the service of process of a 
debt-collection claim.  However, if many debtors are not even aware 
that they have a debt in collection, then debt collectors are clearly 
not strictly adhering to the validation notice requirements.276 
Additionally, Missouri courts do not protect debtors from claims 
that should be barred due to a faulty pleading.  Inaccurate 
information about who holds a debt should bar a suit from even 
reaching an inquiry into whether the creditor provided adequate 
notice.  Yet, creditors and debt collectors often serve process on suits 
that should not proceed.277  The current pleading requirement for a 
debt-collection lawsuit in a Missouri court sets a very low bar; there 
                                                     
 272. See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text (recounting that the replevin 
orders in Fuentes were issued simultaneously with the filing of the collection actions, 
but the debtors had not yet received a summons); NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, DEBT 
DECEPTION:  HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME 
NEW YORKERS 1–2 (2010) (sampling 451 New York residents sued by debt buyers, 71% 
of who reported either never being served or served improperly). 
 273. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012). 
 274. Id. § 1692g(a)(1)–(5) (including information such as the amount and the 
name of the original creditor). 
 275. Id. § 1692k. 
 276. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (“Many consumers are not 
aware that they have debts in collections until they . . . review their credit reports.”); 
see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Considers Debt Collection Rules (Nov. 6, 
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-debt-collection-
rules (“Consumers are complaining about only becoming aware of a collection 
account when they find it on their credit report . . . .”). 
 277. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text (listing the various deficiencies 
in the filing practice of debt buyers that should result in a suit being barred); see also 
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
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are no additional or specialized statutory requirements placed on 
collection suits.278  Debt collectors frequently succeed in obtaining 
judgments against debtors based on minimal evidence that the 
debtor actually owes the debt.279 
The lack of adequate notice to protect against a defective claim 
being filed against a debtor mirrors the due process failures of the 
statutes the Court found unconstitutional in Fuentes.280  In Fuentes, the 
state courts had routinely issued writs of replevin based upon 
affidavits containing “bare assertion[s],”—debt collectors needed 
only to state their entitlement to the property in a “conclusory 
fashion” for a clerk to issue a writ.281  The same situation is playing 
out in courtrooms across Missouri.  Debt collectors are able to bring a 
claim, issue a summons, succeed in a suit, and obtain a garnishment 
order based solely on the paltry information provided by the debt 
collector regarding whether the debtor being sued actually owns the 
debt, regardless of whether it is within the statute of limitations.282  
Much like the “bare assertion[s]” alleged in Fuentes that ultimately led 
to unjust garnishments, debt collectors in Missouri often assert claims 
based on often erroneous and unverified information, leading to 
similarly unjust garnishments.283  Proper adherence to the validation 
requirements would place debtors on notice that a false claim is 
                                                     
 278. MO. R. R.C.P. § 55.22 (2016) (“When a claim or defense is founded upon a 
written instrument, the same may be pleaded according to legal effect, or may be 
recited at length in the pleading, or a copy may be attached to the pleading as an 
exhibit.”); see also Letter from Attorney Gen. of Mo. to Hon. Lisa White Hardwick 
(Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Attorney General’s Letter], https://ago.mo.gov/docs/de 
fault-source/press-releases/2015/debtcollectionpractices.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (lamenting the 
repeated failure of debt buyers to provide adequate proof of ownership of a debt 
when filing a claim, despite a ruling from the Missouri Supreme Court that expressly 
required debt buyers to demonstrate a clear chain of assignment in order to have 
standing to bring a collection claim (citing CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58, 65 
(Mo. 2012))). 
 279. See HUMAN RIGHTS Watch, supra note 61, at 45; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 280. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 281. Id. at 74. 
 282. See supra Section I.B (examining the practices of debt buyers, including 
liability disclaimers and robo-signing, that result in very little information about a 
debt being transmitted during the sale of a debt portfolio, yet indicating the out-
sized number of collection suits that debt buyers bring each year based on that 
information). 
 283. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 75.  Further, as in Fuentes where the debtor had no chance 
to rebut the claim because the garnishment was effected pre-judgment, debtors in 
Missouri also do not have the chance to contest the allegation because of inadequate 
opportunity to be heard due to the failures in the process.  Id. at 82–83. 
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being filed against them, and also enable the debtor to halt the 
collection process prior to the commencement of a suit. 
Time-barred debt, or so-called “zombie debt,”284 is another method 
through which debt collectors are securing judgments based on less-
than-ethical practices.285  Creditors often bring debt-collection suits 
after the statute of limitations has run, but debtors are largely 
unaware that a statute of limitations even exists.286  That debt 
collectors continue to bring these claims, even when counsel is 
present on the opposing side, demonstrates the willingness of the 
debt-collection industry to resurrect old debts.287 
Missouri creditors are also not providing debtors with adequate 
notice regarding possible exemptions.  There is a demonstrated gap 
in awareness among the low-income debtor population in Missouri 
regarding qualifications for the head-of-household exemption to 
garnishment.288  Currently, the burden falls on the debtor to assert 
the exemption in court,289 but even when debtors appear, they 
generally lack counsel or knowledge of the exemption.290  Notice of a 
debt-collection action should contain explicit instructions on how 
debtors can obtain an exemption to which they legally are entitled.291  
The current practice of providing notice that is lacking clear, 
                                                     
 284. Sobol, supra note 94, at 327–28; KUEHNHOFF & SAUNDERS, supra note 97, at 2 
(offering suggestions on how to prevent time-barred debts from being revived). 
 285. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 45 (charging that the practice of 
initiating suits to collect time-barred debts is a clear violation of the FDCPA). 
 286. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 287. Id.; Sobol, supra note 94, at 346 (“Despite prohibitions on threatening or 
filing lawsuits, collectors continue to threaten legal action, file lawsuits, and obtain 
judgments (primarily default judgments) on time-barred debts.  In the majority of 
states, the passage of the limitations period is an affirmative defense that the debtor 
must raise.  As a practical matter, alleged debtors rarely raise this defense, since most 
lawsuits result in default judgments.”). 
 288. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (identifying 
service of process requirements that allow debtors to request a hearing when they are 
incorrectly identified as “not head of a family,” but noting that the notice does not 
include information indicating that correct identification as head of a family will lead 
to a reduction in the garnishment by close to half). 
 289. See Kiel, supra note 141 (referencing the lack of “clear notice” provided to 
debtors regarding the head of family exemption, and the burden that falls on the 
debtors to assert the exemption); supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining 
the head-of-household exemption requirements). 
 290. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (reporting that the mayor of Jennings, 
Missouri, was initially unaware that there was a head-of-household exemption that 
could have offered her some protection from overzealous debt collectors). 
 291. Kiel, supra note 141. 
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readable language on exemption requirements fails to adequately 
protect low-income debtors from an unfair property deprivation. 
2. Lack of opportunity to be heard 
In the St. Louis area, less than 8% of debtors have counsel present 
in debt-collection suits that move to the judgment stage, and for 
debtors in mostly black low-income communities, that number drops 
to 4%.292  While debtors are not constitutionally entitled to counsel in 
civil matters such as debt-collection suits,293 the limited access that 
low-income communities have to legal advice places them at a far 
greater risk of being deprived of the opportunity to be heard prior to 
a post-judgment garnishment.294  This issue echoes the Court’s 
concerns in both Goldberg and Sniadach regarding the inability of low-
income debtors to obtain access to legal advice.295  Debtors can 
appear in court to contest a debt or to negotiate reduced rates of 
repayment with the creditor.296  However, the high incidence of 
default judgments issued against residents in low-income 
communities in St. Louis suggests that debtors are not pursuing these 
two advantageous and lawful avenues for resolution of the claim.297 
Another similarity to the limited access to counsel in Missouri can 
be found in a comparison with Fuentes.  In Fuentes, the Court held that 
procedures that do not provide a debtor with an opportunity to rebut 
a creditor’s garnishment claim are inadequate because they do not 
provide a “real test” of the issue.298  The same problem presents in 
Missouri.  Debtors either do not have notice of a suit, do not 
understand the service of process they have received, or simply do 
                                                     
 292. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 293. Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (stating that the right 
to counsel is only automatic in instances when a defendant’s physical liberty is at 
stake; in alternative situations, a court is to apply the balancing test established in 
Mathews); see also id. at 27 (holding that an indigent woman was not entitled to 
counsel in a civil proceeding, despite a substantial interest in the potential 
termination of her parental status). 
 294. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 2 (reporting that only 3% of Missouri debtors 
sued by a hospital collection agency had legal representation); Kiel & Waldman, 
supra note 5 (referring to the barriers that prevent low-income black communities 
from having equal access to legal advice in Missouri). 
 295. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–64 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. 
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1969). 
 296. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96, 97 (1972). 
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not recognize the legal nature of the action.299  This lack of 
appreciation for the situation at hand, coupled with limited legal 
resources, often results in a default judgment.  These limitations 
create the same situation as in Fuentes, where the debtors were denied 
any chance to contest a taking prior to a hearing on the merits, if at 
all.  In St. Louis, when a debt-collection action proceeds to a 
garnishment—typically through a default judgment—the debtor has 
likely never had an opportunity to engage in the legal action.  The 
comparison with Fuentes is strengthened by the permanent nature of 
garnishment in comparison to the temporary property at issue in 
Fuentes.300  Low-income communities in St. Louis are thus being 
deprived of an opportunity to be heard, and this is directly related to 
the community’s lack of access to counsel. 
The disadvantages created by the inability to obtain or afford legal 
advice in low-income communities in St. Louis runs counter to the 
sentiment expressed by the Court in Sniadach.301  The “hardship” 
exception created by the Sniadach Court aimed to prevent “grave 
injustices” from befalling indigent debtors.302  The Court noted that 
where wages are at stake, a rule that satisfies procedural due process 
in other contexts may not withstand scrutiny.303  While the Court in 
Mitchell later narrowed the exception to exclude temporary 
deprivations of property, the deprivations at stake in Missouri are not 
temporary.304  The key distinction between the results in Missouri and 
the narrowing of the decision in Mitchell that makes the “hardship” 
                                                     
 299. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (explaining that the lack of debtors’ 
understanding of the legal nature of debt-collection lawsuits coupled with the scarce 
legal options available to them embolden judgment-creditors to file non-meritorious 
suits). 
 300. Compare Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84 (clarifying that the Florida and Pennsylvania 
statutes at issue afforded a person the ability to institute an action to recover what 
had been replevied prior to a post-seizure hearing and final judgment), with Kiel & 
Waldman, supra note 5 (noting the disproportionate and likely irreparable impact a 
garnishment judgment of up to a quarter of a worker’s after-tax pay has on lower-
income debtors). 
 301. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1969). 
 302. Id. at 340 (reviewing the harms that befall a family when wages are 
garnished). 
 303. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974); Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 
340–42 (“The result is that a prejudgment garnishment . . . may as a practical matter 
drive a wage earning family to the wall.”). 
 304. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 617–20 (explaining that the degree of danger 
resulting from a mistaken seizure is offset by documentary requirements and the 
temporary nature of the potentially wrongful seizure); see supra Section I.A 
(chronicling the effects of wage garnishment in Missouri). 
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exception relevant is the permanence of wage garnishment.305  In 
majority black communities in Missouri, where access to legal advice 
is either unavailable or unaffordable, the current wage garnishment 
procedures do not meet due process requirements under the 
“hardship” exception.306  Even a small reduction in weekly take-home 
pay can have an outsized effect on a low-income family’s ability to 
survive in the St. Louis area.307 
C. Application of the Modified Mathews-Doehr Test 
The modified Mathews-Doehr test demonstrates that low-income 
debtors in Missouri have a more compelling interest in retaining the 
funds to which they are legally entitled than judgment-creditors have 
in executing a wage garnishment.  The test is the most appropriate 
vehicle for courts to ensure that debt collectors in St. Louis, Missouri, 
respect the due process rights of debtors because it allows courts to 
weigh the various interests at stake in debt-collection actions between 
two private parties.308  The traditional Mathews test does not align 
perfectly with this sort of proceeding because the traditional 
application of the test balances a deprivation initiated by the 
government, not by a private actor.309  However, the modified version 
of the test that the Court applied in Doehr is appropriate in the 
Missouri scenario, despite the focus of Doehr being a pre-judgment, 
versus a post-judgment, attachment.  First, the debt-collection 
litigation occurs between two private parties who each have a claim to 
the property interest, as was the case in all of the Sniadach tetrad cases 
and Doehr.  Second, the circumstances in Missouri mirror the 
property disputes brought in Doehr and the Sniadach tetrad, where 
wages and property assets were seized prior to a hearing as low-
income Missourians deficient notice and lack of an opportunity to be 
heard are analogous to a pre-hearing situation. 
                                                     
 305. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340 (emphasizing the potential for irreparable harm 
associated with a wrongful pre-judgment imposition of wage garnishment); Mitchell, 
416 U.S. at 618 (finding the Louisiana statute constitutional because it sought to 
“protect[] the debtor’s interest in every conceivable way”). 
 306. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340; supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text 
(citing the “pernicious” gap in access to resources in mostly black communities). 
 307. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340; FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 11–12 
(linking the cycle of poverty in the region to the ongoing violence in St. Louis). 
 308. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1991). 
 309. Allen C. Myers, Note, Untangling the Safety Net:  Protecting Federal Benefits from 
Freezes, Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 371, 395–96 (2009) (reviewing 
the application of the Mathews test to garnishment cases involving federal benefits). 
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The Mathews-Doehr test, therefore, correctly balances the following 
interests:  (1) the protected interest of the debtor in improperly 
garnished wages, (2) the debt collector’s property interest in reclaiming 
an outstanding debt, (3) the government interest in efficient and 
effective judicial proceedings, and (4) the veracity interest that ensures 
against the erroneous deprivation of a protected interest.310 
The modified test provides an appropriate structure to balance (1) 
the competing private interests (the debtor and the creditor) at stake 
in the disputed property, with (2) the government’s interest, and (3) 
the risks and rewards advanced by competing procedural processes.311  
Application of the modified balancing test demonstrates that debtors 
hold a substantial private interest in their garnished wages and that 
judgment-creditors, conversely, do not have a significant private 
interest in obtaining the entire judgment awarded in debt collection 
actions.  Moreover, the fact that the government will not suffer from 
excessively increased administrative burdens in debt collection 
lawsuits in Missouri if more protection is afforded to debtors, coupled 
with the substantial risk inherent in erroneously awarding a judgment 
to debt collectors under current Missouri law, further bolsters the 
argument for enhanced protections for debtors. 
1. Judgment-debtors in Missouri have a substantial private interest in 
garnished wages 
Under the Mathews-Doehr test, a court will consider the 
substantiality of the debtor’s private interest and will then evaluate 
that interest in relation to the competing interests of the private party 
creditor and the government.312  A final piece of the balancing test is 
to weigh those competing interests against the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation under the current procedures. 
                                                     
 310. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (“We now consider the Mathews factors in 
determining the adequacy of the procedures before us with regard to the safeguards 
of notice and a prior hearing . . . .”); supra notes 236–44 and accompanying text 
(discussing the use of the Mathews test in Doehr); see also infra notes 312–40 (applying 
the Mathews-Doehr test to the Missouri debt-collection crisis). 
 311. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10 (“Here the inquiry is similar, but the focus is 
different.”); Beale, supra note 179, at 1644 (“[T]he Court’s modification of Mathews 
in Doehr represents an appropriate shift in the due process calculus . . . .”).  In Doehr, 
a prejudgment attachment statute was held as unconstitutional when the Court 
determined that the risk of an erroneous deprivation to the debtor was too great 
where the statute did not require notice or prior hearing or bond, and no adequate 
safeguards were in place.  Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12. 
 312. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12. 
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The private interest that debtors in Missouri have in retaining their 
earned income is substantial, and too often creditors deprive debtors 
of their rightful income.  For instance, a low-income debtor is likely 
eligible for an exemption, but that debtor generally has no knowledge 
that he or she must assert the protection.313  The resulting deprivation 
can severely impact the ability of the household to function.314 
Additionally, a debt collector must meet the FDCPA’s requirements 
for validating debts with the creditor and communicating debts to 
consumers.315  If a debt collector brings a suit against a debtor based 
on a non-validated debt, then the debt collector has brought that suit 
in error, and the debtor suffers yet another unjust deprivation of 
funds.316  The FDCPA imposes liability on debt collectors that bring a 
suit without complying with the statutory requirements.317  However, 
debt collectors that wrongfully seize funds after securing a judgment 
from an improperly filed suit are rarely held accountable for their 
actions.318  A seizure of this sort is a clear and substantial deprivation 
of property.  The communities in Missouri that are the most 
impacted by these practices can see unforgiving consequences from 
the resulting garnishment.319 
The Court has repeatedly noted the substantial interest in 
protecting income in cases dealing with a deprivation of property that 
is essential to a person’s survival.  For example, in Goldberg, the Court 
recognized the great import of maintaining access to welfare benefits 
that families survive on.320  Similarly, in Sniadach, one of the early 
cases addressing pre-judgment garnishment, the Court recounted the 
“tremendous hardship” imposed on families who see a reduction in 
                                                     
 313. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (referring to the burden that falls 
on debtors to assert that an exemption applies). 
 314. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing debtors who are constantly 
plagued by worries about how they will provide for their families). 
 315. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692g (2012). 
 316. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 40–45.  Debt buyers frequently 
bring suits based on debt portfolio purchases that include very limited information 
about who owns a debt, and when the suits have not been subjected to rigorous 
verification procedures yet result in a default judgment, debtors are stripped of their 
rightful property.  See id. at 40–45 (emphasizing the negligent practices of debt 
buyers that engage in collection litigation). 
 317. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 
 318. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 1 (“These problems are often 
discovered long after the debt buyers have already won court judgments against 
alleged debtors . . . .”). 
 319. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (detailing the myriad harms that befall 
families in St. Louis who are stricken with garnishments). 
 320. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
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wages.321  In the opinion for Fuentes, the Court equated the loss of 
critical household goods to that of the wage and welfare benefit 
deprivations in both Sniadach and Goldberg.322  There is an analogous 
and similarly weighty property deprivation occurring in Missouri, 
where debtors’ access to their rightful income is vital to many 
families’ livelihoods. 
2. Judgment-creditors do not have a significant private interest in recovering 
the entire award in a debt-collection lawsuit 
Although judgment-creditors have an interest in retaining the 
profits they earn from collecting on debts, that interest is not nearly 
as significant as the judgment-debtor’s interest in retaining access to 
the same funds.  While a weightier interest in favor of the debt 
collector may exist when viewing the claims in the aggregate, the 
majority of the actions that debt collectors bring in Missouri courts 
are for very small sums of money,323 and an undue property 
deprivation is evaluated in an analysis specific to the case at hand.324  
The volume of claims that most debt collectors pursue ensures a 
steady return on the resources they invest in litigation.325  This debt 
recovery minimizes the substantiality of the interest and the 
likelihood that debt companies would suffer serious losses if courts 
barred them from pursing certain suits. 
Furthermore, enforcing or enhancing the procedural burdens on 
the debt collector at the time of filing would not actually constitute a 
deprivation of property for the valid owner of the debt.  For instance, 
requiring enhanced documentation of proof of validation or 
augmented requirements for communication and notice will not 
prevent a debt collector from proceeding on a valid claim and 
securing a judgment in its favor.326  Such requirements do not 
                                                     
 321. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). 
 322. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89 (1972) (“[A] stove or a bed may be equally 
essential to provide a minimally decent environment for human beings in their day-
to-day lives. It is, after all, such consumer goods that people work and earn a 
livelihood in order to acquire.”). 
 323. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (alleging that debt collectors typically bring 
smaller claims against debtors in majority black communities who have fewer 
financial options available to resolve the debt). 
 324. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) 
(emphasizing that due process must be “appropriate to the nature of the case”). 
 325. See supra note 84 (citing to several reports on the hundreds of millions of 
dollars of revenue that debt collectors see from collection suits). 
 326. See supra Section II.B (detailing the various barriers to notice and opportunity 
to be heard that the low-income communities in Missouri are faced with in debt-
collection suits); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77–79 (calling for 
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preclude a debtor from eventually repaying a valid debt that a debt 
collector is collecting on.327  The additional protections would simply 
ensure that the debt is collected in a manner that fully complies with 
current regulations, while protecting any funds of interest to the 
creditor that the debtor is legally entitled to retain. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a debtor has a 
property interest in her wages, a court should strongly consider the 
importance of that interest.328  However, the Court noted in the 
Sniadach tetrad and Doehr that whether one or both of the private 
parties had a preexisting interest in the property at issue was a critical 
determination related to the weight afforded to that party’s claim.329  
If the creditor has no preexisting interest in the wages, a court’s 
determination of where the greater interest lies weighs heavily in 
favor of the debtor.330  This distinction is especially relevant in 
lawsuits brought by debt buyers or third-party collectors as opposed 
to the original creditor.  Debt collectors who were never originally 
owed a debt, but who simply purchased the debt from the original 
creditor, have no preexisting interest in the property.331  Accordingly, 
these third-party debt collectors have a far lower interest relative to 
the debtor’s substantial interest in retaining their own wages. 
3. Affording judgment-debtors more protection in debt-collection suits will not 
create excessive administrative burdens for the government 
The government’s interest in ensuring fair and effective debt-
collection suits is significantly lower than either the debtor’s private 
interest or the debt collector’s property interest.  To be sure, 
additional safeguards and procedural protections impose some 
administrative costs; however, adding procedures or judicial 
safeguards to the existing process would likely result in only a slightly 
                                                     
increased burdens to be placed on debt buyers who initiate collection suits in order 
to protect the funds to which debtors or wrongfully sued parties are legally entitled). 
 327. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692g (2012) (outlining creditor requirements for 
validating debts and communicating with debtors). 
 328. See Beale, supra note 179, at 1622 n.148 (citing Laurence Levine, Due Process of 
Law in Pre-Judgment Attachment and the Filing of Mechanics’ Liens, 50 CONN. B.J. 335, 345 
(1976)) (suggesting that a creditor’s preexisting interest in property was a significant 
factor in the Mitchell decision). 
 329. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (finding that a party with no 
preexisting interest in property had “too minimal” of an interest to find in his favor); 
Beale, supra note 179, at 1632 (reviewing how a creditor’s preexisting interest in a 
contested property is “key”). 
 330. Beale, supra note 179, at 1630–37. 
 331. Id. at 1622 n.148. 
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heightened administrative burden.  This burden is already justified by 
the time it should be taking courts to verify the accuracy of each 
claim.332 Some examples of additional safeguards would be 
developing court procedures to ensure that debt collectors provide 
valid information to verify their claims and that the claims are not 
time-barred.  Such additional safeguards or procedural protections 
would minimally increase the burden on the government in its role 
of adjudicating claims and enforcing judgments. 
4. A substantial risk of erroneously depriving a judgment-debtor of wages 
exists under current Missouri law 
The fourth and final step in the Mathews-Doehr analysis evaluates 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedures 
and the potential value of adding new or alternative procedural 
safeguards.333  Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that Missouri’s 
current debt-collection procedures pose a substantial risk that courts 
will erroneously deprive debtors of their property.334  Debt collectors 
frequently ignore the notice and validation requirements of the 
FDCPA by providing inaccurate information in their claims.335  
Authenticating debt becomes more burdensome when debt buyers 
purchase large quantities of debt portfolios that contain minimal or 
inaccurate information about who owns the debt or the value of the 
debt.336  Debtors are often unrepresented and unaware of their rights, 
a problem further compounded by the fact that court clerks may be 
the only check on whether debt collectors satisfy verification 
                                                     
 332. See supra note 84 (listing various sources reporting that debt buyers file many 
thousands of claims for collection each year). 
 333. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976). 
 334. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing debtors who have an overall 
lack of understanding about the suits and garnishments levied against them); Kiel & 
Arnold, supra note 4 (reporting on a debtor who did not understand the debt-
collection lawsuit process or what was required of him). 
 335. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The sale and resale of debts 
has raised concerns about debt data integrity and information flows from creditor to 
debt buyer to subsequent debt buyers.”). 
 336. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at ii (analyzing a three-year study 
that uncovered close to 90 million consumer debt accounts that had been purchased 
by debt buyers); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77 (calculating that debts are sold 
with minimal pieces of ownership information attached to them in order for debt 
buyers to reap a large profit from unreliable debts); see also supra note 88 (reviling 
the practices, such as robo-signing, of debt buyers that allow for so many collection 
claims to be brought successfully on the barest of assertions). 
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requirements.337  While actual notice is not a strict legal requirement, 
debtors have reported never receiving notification of a suit against 
them.338  Additionally, in the absence of an attorney, the few debtors 
who actually appear in court are unfamiliar with how to proceed and 
can be pressured by opposing counsel into giving up their due 
process rights.339  Finally, while debt collectors often bring debtors to 
court over seemingly minimal amounts, those amounts are not 
insignificant for these families.340  Each of these complications alone 
produce a significant risk that the debtor will be wrongly deprived of 
her property.  Taken as a whole, the possibilities for bringing an 
erroneous suit are many.  If implemented reliably, additional 
safeguards to protect debtors could easily overcome these risks. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the existence of a protected property interest, the due 
process failures of current procedure in Missouri, and a clear 
indication from the Mathews-Doehr test that the debtor’s interest in 
earned wages is superior to the debt collector’s, reform is necessary. 
The Ferguson Commission addressed the broader racial and 
economic inequalities in the St. Louis area, and it seeks to begin a 
conversation with the goal of fostering a more peaceful and equitable 
place to live.341  The Commission’s approach to community change 
and development is communicative and interactive, providing an 
instructive starting point in evaluating what constitutes 
constitutionally adequate procedural due process protections for the 
low-income communities of Missouri.342 
                                                     
 337. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77 (suggesting that court systems 
should exert greater pressure on debt buyers to file valid claims by increasing the 
scrutiny with which current claims are examined, and asking legislatures to fund 
programs that will educate and represent low-income debtors who cannot navigate 
the system successfully on their own). 
 338. See supra note 271 (narrating accounts from debtors who saw their wages 
garnished when they had no recollection of ever receiving notice that their debt was 
in collection). 
 339. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 340. See supra Section I.A and accompanying text. 
 341. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 6–7. 
 342. Id. (explaining the Commission’s goals to make St. Louis fair, equitable, and 
just). 
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A. Notice Must Be Tailored to Meet the Needs of Low-Income Communities 
in Missouri Whose Debts Are in Collection 
As the Court held in Sniadach, even when notice conforms to statutory 
requirements, a property deprivation resulting in “hardships,” like those 
felt in Missouri communities, can still violate procedural due process if 
notice and the opportunity to be heard are not tailored to the 
circumstances.343  Notice requirements for debt-collection suits directed 
at low-income communities should be tailored to address “all [of the] 
circumstances” affecting community members.344  For instance, 
landlord-tenant problems, health and safety concerns, or poor 
employment opportunities can all force a family to move from city to 
city.345  As a result, the addresses that debt collectors have on file can be 
out of date, assuming they were even correct in the first place.346  Process 
in debt collection suits should be augmented with additional procedures 
to ensure that debtors receive adequate notice to protect against the 
voluminous amount of suspect judgments entered against low-income 
debtors in St. Louis.347  As a final layer of protection against erroneous 
judgments, the notice provided to debtors should clearly outline the 
procedure for claiming an exemption. 
The government of Missouri should work to implement additional 
regulations to require debt collectors to meet a higher standard of 
pleading when filing debt collection lawsuits.348  Currently, claims can 
                                                     
 343. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (addressing the 
serious societal harms that result from the “hardship” imposed by the garnishment of 
wages). 
 344. See Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1982) (affirming that notice is 
best effected when it is “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections”). 
 345. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 n.9. 
 346. See supra note 54 (recounting the stories of people in the St. Louis area who 
have been forced to relocate due to circumstances beyond their control); see supra 
notes 76–78 and accompanying text (detailing the practices of debt buyers that result 
in nominal, often erroneous, amounts of information regarding debt ownership to 
be conveyed in debt portfolio sales). 
 347. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 78 (calling for both debt collectors and 
courts to independently provide notice to debtors regarding debt-collection suits). 
 348. See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 278, at 6 (requesting that the 
Missouri Supreme Court Commission on Racial and Ethnic Fairness revise court 
rules to “require plaintiffs in lawsuits to collect consumer debt to provide with their 
petition documentation of all assignments demonstrating the plaintiff’s right to collect 
the debt from the consumer”); accord JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN 
SYSTEM:  PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 14–
19 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rep 
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be filed based solely on the debt collector’s assertions that a debtor 
owes a debt; however, because debt buyers purchase debt in large 
portfolios, there is oftentimes no mechanism to verify individual 
debts beyond an affidavit claiming that the debt can be traced back to 
the original creditor.349 
Furthermore, requiring heightened accountability from debt 
collectors filing collection claims also addresses the problems caused 
by time-barred debts, or “zombie debts.”350  Debt collectors may allege 
that debtors have extended the statute of limitations by, for example, 
making voluntary payments, and without the debtor present to raise 
the affirmative defense, the suit proceeds.351  The Attorney General of 
Missouri recently enacted new regulations, one of which begins to 
address this problem.352  The new regulation makes any threat to file 
or filing of a lawsuit past the statute of limitations unlawful.353  The 
other new regulation works to eliminate a loophole that allows debt 
collectors to restart the clock on a statute of limitations-
reaffirmation.354  Under the regulation, debt collectors cannot “seek 
or obtain without valuable consideration” any reaffirmation of a debt 
that was previously time-barred.355  The full effect of the new 
regulations has yet to be seen, but in furtherance of the Attorney 
                                                     
orts/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-
broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf (noting that if states adopted 
increased pleading standards similar to those required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8, they could better protect consumers from debt-collection suits both filed 
against them in error or without the requisite proof of ownership demonstrated by the 
filer); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77 (appealing to state governments to 
require debt collectors to provide “meaningful evidence” when filing claims). 
 349. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text (detailing the frequency with 
which debt-collection claims are filed on bare assertions of unverified information); supra 
notes 85–94 and accompanying text (reviewing the litigation practices of debt buyers that 
rely on sparse amounts of identifying information when filing collection suits). 
 350. See supra note 284 (defining the increased prevalence of suits filed on time-
barred debt claims, or “zombie debt”). 
 351. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (doubting the validity of a debt collector’s 
claim that the statute of limitations in Rosalyn Turner’s collection suit had been 
extended because of a voluntary payment when Turner denied such a payment). 
 352. AG Koster’s Reforms Against Abusive Debt-Collection Practices Effective Today (June 
30, 2016, 3:56 PM) [hereinafter AG Koster’s Reforms], https://ago.mo.gov/home/ag-
koster-s-reforms-against-abusive-debt-collection-practices-effective-today. 
 353. Id.; MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.100 (2016).  The regulation also 
makes unlawful the threat to file or filing of any claim that has been discharged by a 
bankruptcy court, voided by a court, or deemed satisfied under a debtor-creditor 
agreement.  § 60-8.100. 
 354. AG Koster’s Reforms, supra note 352. 
 355. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.100. 
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General’s objectives, courts should also require creditors to 
affirmatively offer proof verifying that a collection suit still falls within 
the statutory time frame for filing.356 
B. Access to Legal Advice Will Ensure that Low-Income Communities in the 
St. Louis Area Have the Opportunity to Be Heard 
In Missouri debt collection lawsuits, low-income debtors rarely have 
legal representation.357  The courtroom is an intimidating place for 
any lay person, and debt collection lawsuits in Missouri proceed 
under a complex layering of federal statutes and state regulations 
that a debtor with “virtually no understanding of the law” will struggle 
to navigate.358  While defending against a debt collection suit is more 
than just saying some “magic words,”359 debtor’s chances of deploying 
an effective defense are slim when they appear pro se.360 
An even greater threat to an unrepresented debtor is falling victim 
to “hallway conferences.”361  While negotiated settlements between 
debtors and debt collectors are, in theory, a positive and proactive 
result for all parties involved, the reality is that experienced lawyers 
bully debtors into settlements that they do not understand.362  These 
                                                     
 356. See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 278, at 7 (charging Missouri courts 
to amend the rule governing default judgments to include a requirement that debt 
collectors certify a claim is still within the statutory limiting period when filed); accord 
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RULES NEEDED TO STOP DEBT COLLECTION ABUSES 1 
(2016), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/Debt-Collection-Priorities 
-2016.pdf (advocating for a prohibition on the collection of time-barred debt both in 
and out of litigation).  See generally Sobol, supra note 94 (justifying the need to better 
regulate debt-collection actions over “zombie debt” with an analysis of the increasing 
prevalence of and problems with time-barred debt). 
 357. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (determining that in debt-collection 
lawsuits filed in St. Louis between 2008 and 2012, only 8% of defendants had legal 
representation, and only 4% of defendants from black communities had such 
representation). 
 358. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53 (assessing the difficulties that 
arise when a layperson attempts to appear unrepresented in a debt-collection suit). 
 359. Magic Words, THIS AM. LIFE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.thisamericanlife.org 
/radio-archives/episode/532/transcript (covering the proceedings of a debt-
collection claim where the debtors caused the debt collector to drop the action by 
saying the magic words “show me the evidence”). 
 360. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53. 
 361. See id. at 4 (“Many defendants come to court intending to fight the case 
against them but end up capitulating in the courthouse hallways. Some are 
persuaded that they have no choice.”); Magic Words, supra note 359 (recounting an 
experience where a reporter observed and engaged in a courtroom battle with a 
lawyer representing a debt collector who was attempting to pressure a couple into 
settling by bringing them out into the hallway to “negotiate”). 
 362. See Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 224. 
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conferences can easily veer into the realm of coercive and 
threatening practices that violate the explicit provisions of the 
FDCPA.363  Without any legal knowledge to rely on, debtors are 
essentially “[t]hrown to the [w]olves.”364  To alleviate the difficult 
situation that many debtors in the low-income communities of St. 
Louis find themselves in when unrepresented in a debt-collection 
suit, Missouri lawmakers should work to promote legal access for 
impoverished debtors.365 
C. Additional Financial Protections Are Necessary to Protect Low-Income 
Communities in Missouri from the Overly Harsh Practices of Debt Collectors 
Congress should update the Credit Consumer Protection Act, the 
federal law regulating wage garnishment, to reflect the current 
financial climate.  Since Congress enacted the CCPA in 1968, the 
statute has not kept pace with inflation, and rather than rely on state 
law, courts have generally deferred to the CCPA’s regulatory 
scheme.366  Lowering the after-tax income amount eligible for 
garnishment below its current rate of 25% will protect low-income 
debtors who are demonstrably misrepresented in the allocation of 
debt collection judgments.367 
Interest rate regulation compounds the failures of Missouri’s 
regulatory system in protecting low-income households.368  The 
interest rates attached to many loans are predatory and often are set 
at extraordinarily high levels.369  Not only do debtors face exorbitant 
                                                     
 363. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012) (outlining illegal debt-collection practices, 
including false representation that nonpayment will result in damaging legal 
consequences); supra Section I.A.1 (examining the legal requirements of the FDCPA). 
 364. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53. 
 365. Kiel, supra note 141 (suggesting that many plaintiffs in debt-collection suits in 
Missouri, such as utility companies or hospitals, that have an “obligation to serve the 
public” offer assistance programs to lower-income debtors and that few have 
knowledge of the programs); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77 
(discussing the need for state legislatures to “fund programs that provide 
independent legal advice or representation to low-income defendants in debt-
collection cases”). 
 366. “Missouri does not regulate collection agencies . . . .”  Debt Collection, supra 
note 136. 
 367. See Kiel, supra note 141 (noting that four states prohibit the use of 
garnishment in debt-collection actions for most debts—Texas, Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina—and arguing that more states need to follow suit 
because “low-income workers can’t afford to lose a quarter of their pay”). 
 368. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing how high predatory loan 
interest rates can be, citing to some in the triple digits). 
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interest accruing on their loans, but Missouri regulations allow a 
judgment-creditor to attach that same interest rate from the original 
credit extension contract to the judgment.370  The “exploding debts” 
that ensue from such deleterious practices have created cycles of debt 
that can be likened to indentured servitude.371 
Finally, a loophole in the current law allows debt collectors to seize 
a debtor’s entire bank account.372  When a debtor’s paycheck is 
eligible for garnishment, the federal law limits creditors from seizing 
more than 25%.373  However, if the debtor places that paycheck into a 
bank account, the entire contents of that account can be seized, and 
in the absence of any statutory language addressing such seizures, 
collectors commonly engage in the practice.374  Such seizures severely 
constrain debtors’ ability to support themselves financially. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the course of only a handful of years, Missouri courtrooms 
have become infected with uncontrolled and unchecked lawsuits over 
the collection of debts.  Both the debt-buyer industry’s unbridled 
growth in recent years and the outdated federal laws that regulate debt 
collection have contributed to the rampant increase in court 
judgments that result in garnishment in the St. Louis area.  This 
increase in garnishments has had a particularly devastating impact on 
the low-income communities in St. Louis, especially in majority black 
neighborhoods.  When faced with the aggressive, and frequently 
unlawful, practices of debt collectors, members of these communities 
have neither the financial resources to address the debts nor any form 
of affordable or accessible legal advice to defend their rights.  Debtors 
are often unfamiliar with the procedural protections and exemptions 
                                                     
 370. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text (referring to the law that 
allows contracted rates of interest to be attached at judgment, and noting that the 
minimum interest level attached to a judgment in Missouri is 9%). 
 371. Kiel, supra note 138 (describing a scenario where a debtor’s balance 
increased forty times over due to high judgment interest rates); see also Liberty, supra 
note 140, at 281 (likening modern debt collection to indentured servitude). 
 372. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (examining the failure of the 
CCPA to address the seizure of funds deposited into a debtor’s bank account). 
 373. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (stating the legal cap on 
garnishment as set by the CCPA). 
 374. See Kiel, supra note 141 (listing as one “commonsense reform[]” that debt-
collection laws should “[r]estrict how much can be taken from debtors’ bank 
accounts”); supra notes 132–33 (expounding on the loophole that debt collectors 
exploit to seize an entire bank account). 
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available to them in debt collection suits.  Yet, the current law forces 
debtors to bear the burden of asserting these defenses. 
The current status of federal and state law regulating debt 
collection practices and lawsuits in the state of Missouri violates the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights of 
low-income communities.  The lawsuits brought by debt collectors 
against members of these communities neither provide adequate 
notice nor ensure debtors an opportunity to be heard, and the 
situation that results is in effect a seizure absent a valid judgment.  
Similar to the Supreme Court’s findings in the series of cases 
reviewing pre-judgment garnishment statutes, there is a constitutional 
violation of due process rights when creditors garnish the wages of 
low-income debtors under Missouri’s current regulatory scheme. 
The population of St. Louis has seen far more than its fair share of 
turmoil in recent years.  Underlying the increases in violence, there 
emerges a pernicious disparity in the economic treatment of low-
income communities in Missouri, many of which are majority black 
communities.  The current legal procedures surrounding debt 
collection in Missouri works only to aggravate the already pervasive 
poverty in the region.  A leader of the Ferguson Commission noted, 
“If you’re still stuck in this web of indebtedness, you’re not going to 
be economically mobile.”375  The choices that a family is forced to 
make when they see a post-judgment garnishment seize hundreds of 
dollars of their income each week are some of the hardest 
imaginable.  “That was the worst time in my life,” one woman in 
Jennings, Missouri, recalled, “I used to cry myself to sleep.”376 
 
                                                     
 375. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. 
 376. Id. 
